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ABSTRACT
This Article presents an analysis and defense of the Supreme Court's current Eighth
Amendment case law on prison sentencing. I argue that in the pivotal cases of Ewing v.
California and Harmelin v. Michigan, a plurality of the Supreme Court has assimilated
Eighth Amendment review of individual prison sentences to rationality review of state
action under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. When the cases are read
rightly, it becomes clear that Eighth Amendment review does not really ask whether a
sentence is "grossly disproportionate," as the Court has asserted; rather, it seeks to
identify arbitrary and capricious prison sentences that suggest a procedural defect in the
sentencing process. I defend this doctrine on the grounds of original understanding, stare
decisis, neutral interpretation, and normative federalism values. Finally, I show how an
interpretation of Eighth Amendment prison sentencing review as rationality review can
be squared with the Supreme Court's decisions involving constitutional proportionality
review of other noncapital sanctions such as fines, punitive damages, and conditions of
confinement.
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Purposeless Restraints: Fourteenth Amendment Rationality Scrutiny and the
Constitutional Review of Prison Sentences
Michael P. O’Shea*
It is a rational continuum which . . . includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .1
We have taken special care of you . . . .2
INTRODUCTION
Even by the standards of a contentious age, the Supreme Court has had a difficult
time applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment3
coherently to sentences of imprisonment. Ever since the Lochner-era Court first
determined that the Eighth Amendment limited not only the forms of punishment that
legislatures could employ, but also the magnitude of punishments,4 a majority of the
Court has consistently asserted at least a residual power of judicial review in the area.
The standard of review, however, has fluctuated.5 At one point the Court adopted
a standard so deferential that it seemed to permit virtually any sentence to stand as long
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as the triggering crime was “classifiable as a felony.”6 Less than two years later, the
Court boldly proclaimed that prison terms “must be proportionate to the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted,” and claimed the power to strike down “significantly
dispropo rtionate” sentences.7 And today, the pendulum has swung back: the Court’s
controlling opinions in Harmelin v. Michigan8 and the recent controversial decision in
Ewing v. California9 conclude that the Eighth Amendment contains only a “narrow
proportionality principle”10 that requires courts to strike down “extreme” prison terms
“grossly disproportionate” to the crime.11 Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have authored
the key plurality opinions setting out this standard.
If the opinions are chaotic, the Court’s holdings have been more coherent. They
reflect a deeply deferential approach to noncapital Eighth Amendment review. The Court
has repeatedly upheld life sentences (including those without parole) that were triggered
by minor or moderate crimes such as petty theft and first-time drug possession. The only
discontinuity in the sequence of tough holdings is Solem v. Helm, which struck down a
life sentence without parole imposed on a felony recidivist who obtained $100 by false
pretenses.12
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Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per curiam).

7
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Neither the legal left nor the right is satisfied with this state of affairs. The
Court’s willingness to affirm stringent sentences has produced dissatisfaction among
academic commentators,13 lower court judges,14 dissenting Justices,15 and even some
Justices who have concurred in the Court’s holdings.16 Moreover, the Court’s decisions
arguably threaten to conflict with a fundamental norm of constitutional judging. If a
general principle forbidding excessive punishment is important enough to be embedded
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See, e.g., James J. Brennan, Note, The Supreme Court's Excessive Deference to Legislative Bodies Under
Eighth Amendment Sentencing Review, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 551, 552 (2004) (criticizing Ewing
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217, 219-20 (2003) (Supreme Court "gives teeth" to review of monetary deprivations in punitive damages
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KY. L.J. 107 (1995-1996); Kelly A. Patch, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing
Merely Legislative Grace?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1697, 1722 (Court’s decision in Harmelin “eviscerates”
Eighth Amendment guarantee and “offends … evolving standards of decency”); Nicholas N. Kittrie and
Mark H. Allenbaugh, Jean Valjean Lives, LEGAL TIMES, May 2, 2003 (“After Andrade and Ewing, if any
legislature … in its wisdom chooses to enact harsh and excessive penalties, far be it from the Supreme
Court to correct the wrongs.”); Charles Lane, California’s “3-Strikes” Law Upheld: Supreme Court
Decides Long Prison Terms Legal, WASH. POST, p. A01, Mar. 6, 2003 (“The fact that these sentences don’t
violate the [Constitution] makes it harder to imagine any case in which the court is going to find a sentence
grossly disproportionate.”) (quoting Professor Erwin Chemerinsky).
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4

in the Constitution – and the Court says that it is17 – then why choose to apply that
principle “narrowly” in cases that happen to involve prison sentences? Such a path
appears political, not judicial.18
On the other hand, conservative jurists like Justices Scaliaand Thomas argue that
even the Court’s present narrow judicial review of noncapital sentences is improper, and
urge the explicit overruling of the contrary holding in Solem. Their views can claim a
significant pedigree. Ever since its inception, the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
sentencing jurisprudence has been criticized by originalist Justices who argue thatwhen
the Eighth Amendment was enacted, “cruel and unusual punishment” meant torturous
methods of punishment, but not overlong prison sentences, and that this meaning must
govern today.19
The fight over limits on prison sentencing is one of a family of controversies that
have arisen from the Court's recent decisions in the broad area of proportionality review
– of identifying constitutional limits on the magnitude of sanctions an official
decisionmaker may impose for a given wrongful act. The death penalty is the most
prominent example. In the recent cases of Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the
17

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (asserting that “[t]he Eighth Amendment succinctly
prohibits ‘excessive’ sanctions”); but see U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (prohibiting “excessive” fines and bail,
but “cruel and unusual” punishments).
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Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1062-63 (2004) ("A
review of the cases concerning th[e] . . . different types of punishments reveals profound inconsistencies in
the Supreme Court's approach."); Mary K. Woodburn, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan and Proportionality
Review Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1927, 1942 (1992) (“Objective [Eighth
Amendment] inquiry is not only possible, but required. … That the inquiry may be difficult and
complicated does not excuse the [Supreme] Court from undertaking it.’); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court OKs
Three Strikes Statutes, Megan’s Laws, AM. LAWYER, March 6, 2003 (“Th[e recent] rulings demonstrate
once again that in the area of criminal law, the Court’s instincts are quite conservative and more deferential
to state judgments than they are in other areas of the law.”) (quoting ACLU legal director Steven Shapiro).
19

See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961-985
(opinion of Scalia, J.); Weems, 217 U.S. at 389-411 (White, J., dissenting).
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same Supreme Court that applies the Eighth Amendment cautiously to noncapital
sentences has issued freewheeling opinions that hold the death penalty for first degree
murder to be categorically unconstitutional for offenders under age 1820 or the mildly
retarded.21 The Court has also imposed significant restrictions on the magnitude of
punitive damage awards in civil litigation, grounding these limits not in the Eighth
Amendment,22 but in the due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.23
These "proportionality" decisions exert friction on one another along multiple
axes. It is hard to square the Court's restrained review of prison sentences with its
aggressive review of death sentences. Nor is it obvious that the fining of corporations in
the form of punitive damages should be reviewed with skepticism while the imprisoning
of individuals, a more severe deprivation, is reviewed deferentially. Finally, there is a
normative question: If one concludes that these different lines of decisions are
incompatible, then which doctrine ought to yield to which?
The principal task of this Article is to present and defend a unified analysis of the
Court's prison sentencing jurisprudence culminating in Harmelin and Ewing. I argue that
the prison cases extend the classic New Deal doctrine of Fourteenth Amendment
rationality scrutiny to the magnitude of individual terms of imprisonment. In other
20

Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (Mar. 2, 2005).
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Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not limit punitive damages awards in private civil
litigation).
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that $145 million punitive
damages verdict against insurer for bad-faith failure to settle and other torts violated 14th Amendment due
process when compensatory damages were only $1million and verdict relied upon evidence of out-of-state
conduct).
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words, Ewing and its predecessor cases seek arbitrary and capricious sentences that give
rise to an inference of irrationality or bias on the part of the decisionmaker — the same
kind of procedural defect that implicates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause
limits on general legislative action.
The Article's secondary task is to use the analysis of the prison sentencing cases
to evaluate the other areas of constitutional proportionality review. I conclude that, at
least outside of the unique area of capital punishment, constitutional proportionality
review should follow the principles deployed in the Eighth Amendment prison sentencing
cases.
Accordingly, in Part I of this Article, I briefly discuss the legal framework of
Fourteenth Amendment rationality scrutiny. Part II traces the development of the
Supreme Court’snoncapital Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in a series of sometimes
conflicting opinions that culminates in Harmelin v. Michigan and Ewing v. California. I
show that the legal standard adopted by the pluralities in Harmelin and Ewing is best
understood as rationality review of sentencing. Part III presents normative arguments for
conceiving noncapital Eighth Amendment review as rationality review, as Harmelin and
Ewing have tacitly done. Finally, Part IV examines the relationships between the use of
rationality review in the prison sentencing context and the Supreme Court's holdings in
related contexts such as punitive damages and capital punishment.
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I.

THE STRUCTURE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RATIONALITY
REVIEW
A.

Four Modes of Due Process Review

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment24 has played four roles at
different times in its 137-year history. As befits its name, it has been a source of bedrock
procedural guarantees such as the reasonable doubt standard of proof25 and the
requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of liberty or
property.26 Second, it has provided the textual vehicle by which the courts have
incorporated most of the guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights against the states.27
Third, and most controversially, it has served as a source of unenumerated "fundamental"
rights that implicate close judicial scrutiny, ranging from a right to keep slaves as
property28 to a right to freedom of contract29 to a right to elective abortion.30 It is the
24

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .").
25

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due
process in a criminal trial requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the charged offense).

26

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

27

See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). There is a
well-known debate, which falls outside the scope of this Article, about the propriety of reading the due
process clause as incorporating the Bill of Rights, with many scholars suggesting that other constitutional
provisions would better serve that role, such as the Ninth Amendment, see RANDY A. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), or the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, see
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 181-214 (1998). My analysis takes no sides in this debate, but
does assume that the Eighth Amendment properly applies against the states on one or another basis. See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
28

See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

29

See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).

30

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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fourth role that sheds light on the Eighth Amendment prison cases. The clause has also
been taken to impose a free-standing general prohibition against government action that
is arbitrary and capricious.31 This is rationality review properly so called, and it is
simultaneously universal and limited. As applied to legislative action, such review
requires only that the action "rest upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators," not that it overcome the sort of demanding burden imposed
on laws that impinge a specifically recognized constitutional right.32
Rationality review became formalized as a distinctive level of constitutional
scrutiny in the New Deal era, when the Supreme Court retreated from the aggressive
enforcement of unenumerated economic liberties that had characterized the preceding
era. The rational basis standard received its classic articulation in 1938, in United States
v. Carolene Products Co.33 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products opinion famously
suggested that laws infringing certain specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, interfering
with the political process, or disadvantaging discrete and insular minorities would receive
"more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than . . . most other types of legislation."34 But as to the large remaining
category of "other types of legislation," the courts would merely ensure that statutes were
not irrational:
31

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) ("the core of the concept" of due process is
"protection against arbitrary action"); United States R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980)
(legislation is invalid if it "achieves its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way"); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 511 (1934) (due process
demands that laws not be "arbitrary or capricious"); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884).

32

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).

33

304 U.S. 144 (1938).

34

Id. at 152 n.4.
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The existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed[.]
[L]egislation … is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators. . . .
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose
constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial
notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry . . . and the
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of
facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to
exist.35
Regulatory statutes would be upheld as long as it was "at least debatable" that regulation
was appropriate.36
The adoption of a modest and deferential form of Fourteenth Amendmentreview ,
in the form of the rationality standard, raised the prospect that courts might go further and
simply abdicate the review of legislation that did not present a special basis for
heightened scrutiny. During the Cold War era, several Supreme Court opinions came
close to this purely vestigial conception of rationality review.37 As discussed in the

35

Id. at 152-53 (citations and footnote omitted).

36

Id. at 154.

37

In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), eight Justices dismissively rejected a due process challenge
to a Kansas statute limiting the practice of debt adjusting to lawyers. Justice Black approvingly cited
Justice Holmes's contention that "a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained
by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 730. Black added that "relief,
if any be needed, lies not with us but with the body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas." Id. at
732. Interestingly, Justice Harlan chose to concur separately, affirming in a single sentence the more
traditional conception of rationality review under which "th[e] state measure [must] bea[r] a rational
relation to a constitutionally permissible objective." Id. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court unanimously affirmed, after a
speculative search for a possible legitimate interest, an Oklahoma statute forbidding opticians to fit
eyeglass lenses into new frames without a written prescription from an opthalmologist or optometrist, and
forbidding advertisements for eyeglass frames. "We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation
to th[e] objective [of public health] and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds." Id. at 491; see also
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1566
(2004) (arguing that Carolene Products imposed a "virtually conclusive" and "ferociously strong"
presumption of constitutionality that "effectively . . . abolished" due process review in the area of
commercial legislation).
Lund and McGinnis also contend that all such challenges to economic regulations have failed in
the modern era. Id.; but cf. Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 US 498 (1998) (invalidating as unconstitutional a
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following subsection, however, the Court has more recently returned to the original
conception of rationality review first set out in Carolene Products. In this Article,
"rationality review" denotes a genuine test, one that can be violated in extreme or unusual
circumstances, instead of a euphemism decorating a judicial decision to abdicate review
of state action in a particular area. The latter sort of review will be distinguished by the
term "vestigial review."
B.

Characteristics of Rationality Review

As outlined in Carolene Products and reinforced by subsequent cases( apart from
the Cold War-era dalliance with vestigial review), Fourteenth Amendment rationality
scrutiny has four salient characteristics.
1. Great deference for legislative judgments. The standard is easy to satisfy.
Courts will not hold that a statute or other state action violates due process merely
because it appears unwise. Invalidations are rare.
2. Respect for moral diversity among jurisdictions. One of the key steps in the
demise of Lochner was the Court's assimilation of Justice Holmes's aphorism that "the
14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," or any other social
philosophy.38 Because the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing
views," a court gauging whether a statute bears a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative aim must bear in mind that the law may pursue a wide range of moral aims,

federal coal mining statute that retroactively assigned extensive pension liabilities to a former employer
that had left the coal business 35 years prior to the statute's enactment, and that had not participated in the
promises that gave rise to pension liability, in a judgment whose necessary fifth vote was supplied by
Justice Kennedy on the theory that the statute's application violated due process rationality review).
38

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and that different government actors may place different degrees of weight on these
aims.39
3. A challenger must satisfy a significant initial burden before the court will
engage in weighing evidence. A statute is presumed constitutional,40 and if the reviewing
court can consider the statute on its face and conclude, based on "facts [within] the sphere
of judicial notice," that it rests on a rational basis, then that settles the matter.41 The
statute may be justified by "rational speculation" on the part of the state.42 Indeed, the
government need not even present evidence.43 Only if the statute appears irrational at
first consideration will the court turn to weighing evidence in the record.44
4. A recurrent emphasis on whether substantive outcomes suggest procedural
defects such as bias, caprice, or bad faith. A court invalidating state action under
rationality review will frequently argue that the substantive disposition before the court,
by its enormity, gives rise to an inference of procedural defect. An "arbitrary" or
"irrational" decision is not merely incorrect; rather, it would seem to convict the
decisionmaker of at least some measure of dereliction of duty, of gross incompetence,

39

Id. (arguing that the Constitution "is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.").

40

National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 477 (1985);
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153.

41

Id.

42

FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).

43

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313; Carolene Products,
304 U.S. at 152.

44

See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176 (finding a federal statute conferring retirement benefits satisfied due process
challenge when its "plain language" disclosed possible rational basis).
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bias, malice, or bad faith.45 This idea helps make sense of the famous first appearance of
the concept of "substantive" due process in American law: Justice Chase's separate
opinion in Calder v. Bull, which took it as obvious that a statute that by its terms "takes
property from A and gives it to B" would violate due process of law.46 If the claim is
plausible, its plausibility rests not only upon the undesirability of the substantive outcome
created by the hypothetical "A to B" statute, but by the suspicion it arouses that the
legislature is exercising a grudge against A, or has simply been bought and paid for, and
is discharging a crude political favor owed to "B" or his benefactors.47 Overtones of
rationality review, with its characteristic implication of bad faith or procedural taint in the
state action invalidated, had also appeared in the early economic due process decisions of
the Gilded Age.48
C.

Justifying Rationality Review

Rationality review has been one of the less controversial legal doctrines drawn
from the due process clause. While particular applications of rationality review have

45

See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (holding that executive action violates substantive due
process if it is "egregious" and "outrageous"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985) (invalidating denial of a use permit for a group home housing the mentally retarded, pursuant to
a municipal ordinance, on the basis that ordniance reflected illegitimate prejudice against the retarded);
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969) (holding that due process is violated by "vindictive"
judicial resentencing of a previously sentenced defendant after a successful appeal); Craigmiles v. Giles,
312 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that legislation that failed rationality scrutiny "c[a]me close to
striking us with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish") (internal quotation marks omitted)
46

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798) (emphasis omitted).

47

Cf. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228-29 (condemning state licensure requirements for casket sales as a "naked
attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers"
motivated by an "illegitimate purpose").

48

The Lochner Court, for example, dismissed the New York statute regulating the working hours of bakers
as a "mere meddlesome interferenc[e]" and noted that "many laws of this character, while passed under
what is claimed to be the police power for protecting the public health or welfare are, in reality, passed
from other motives." 198 U.S. at 61, 64.
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been fiercely controverted,49 criticism of the doctrine that manifestly arbitrary and
capricious official acts violate due process has been limited to the more positivist wing
of contemporary conservative jurisprudence.50
Rationality review, properly carried out, does not engage in fine-tuned balancing
of competing interests. Rather, it invalidates only substantive dispositions that are so
egregious that they give rise to inferences of procedural impropriety. It is indeed jarring
to suggest that a guarantee of "due process" prohibits a legislature from enacting a law
forbidding second-trimester abortions;51 the powerful, good-faith interests on both sides
of the issue make plain that any objection to such a statute must be a matter of substance,
not procedure. But consider a hypothetical state statute that requires all motor vehicles in
the state to be driven only in reverse gear. Under current law, this statute would violate
the rationality requirement of the due process clause, and no other constitutional
provision.52 Is it really so paradoxical to say that this statute, by its very nature, is not
only substantively objectionable but procedurally suspect? To the contrary. What one

49

See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense in Colorado, FIRST THINGS 83:34 (May 1998), which
criticizes the holding in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), invalidating, under rational basis scrutiny, a
popularly adopted amendment to the Colorado constitution prohibiting the recognition of homosexual
status as a basis for special status or antidiscrimination claims. Nagel argues that if the Court had paid
more attention in Romer to the "social context" and the legal backdrop against which the amendment was
enacted, it might have found that the amendment was intended to stave off future attempts to disrupt
important social institutions through reform litigation exploiting antidiscrimination principles, and that this
motivation might well have given the amendment a rational basis. See id. (suggesting that voters were
"playing defense against a law reform strategy designed to bring on social revolution without popular
consent.").
50

Robert H. Bork argues, against the Carolene Products Court, that "a conclusive presumption of
constitutionality" should apply to all legislation not within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 58-59 (1990).
.
51
See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
52

It would be extremely difficult to frame the constitutional objection to this statute as an equal protection
challenge, for all drivers and all motor vehicles are equally subject to the statute. The hypothetical is thus a
useful illustration of the analytical distinctness of equal protection rationality review and due process
rationality review, though they frequently overlap in practice.
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wants to say of a legislature capricious enough to enact this statute is, precisely, that it is
not doing its job: it is instead engaging in private jokes, or (what is more likely) in simple
bullying.
This connection to the idea of procedure is why it is more intuitive to argue that
the Due Process Clause prohibits official irrationality than it is to argue that the clause
protects certain unenumerated substantive rights.53 It is noteworthy that both of the
originalist Justices on the current Supreme Court, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist,
accept the practice of rationality review.54

II.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE RATIONALITY STANDARD IN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT SENTENCING LAW
Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed an Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence of noncapital sentencing under the pressure of a recurring
originalist critique which claims that the Clause was intended to prohibit only “cruel and

53

Academic criticisms of "substantive due process" focus on the practice of enforcing unenumerated rights,
and rarely address the practice of general rationality review. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 37, at
1558-60, 1562-67 (discussing Dred Scott and Lochner as "paradigm[s] for the . . . development of
substantive due process" in that they involved judges "illegitimately legislating from the bench" and
invalidating statutes that were simply "[o]ffensive to their moral and political sensibilities," but passing
over the rationality requirement of Carolene Products as simply a means of "effectively . . . abolish[ing]"
due process review of general legislation); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998) (arguing that "it may or may not be a good thing to guarantee additional
liberties, but the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation. By its inescapable
terms, it guarantees only process."); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text,
83 VA. L. REV. 493, 500-01 (1997) (considering and criticizing various models of substantive due process
such as a "vested rights" approach, a formal requirement of legislative generality, and the free-wheeling
"real substantive due process" approach of Lochner, but offering only a passing mention of the Carolene
Products requirement of "minimum rationality").
54

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003), which argued that proposed rights that are not firmly rooted in AngloAmerican tradition and history "may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that
law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."
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unusual” modes of punishment, such as torture or drawing and quartering.55 Though the
sequence of opinions has not displayed a smooth and orderly development of doctrine,56
it has lately converged on a standard that is normatively attractive, fits plausibly with the
Eighth Amendment's historical background, and is coherent with several adjacent bodies
of law. This standard calls upon courts to ensure that prison sentences rest on some
rational basis and are not a product of official arbitrariness.
A.

Early Decisions
1.

Weems v. United States

The Supreme Court first indicated that the Constitution permitted review of terms
of imprisonment in the early twentieth century case of Weems v. United States.57 A Coast
55

That the Clause reaches at least the latter sort of state action, prohibiting barbarous modes of corporal
and capital punishment, has never been seriously disputed. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)
(holding that Alabama prison officials violated clearly established Eighth Amendment law by cuffing
refractory prisoners to "hitching posts" without shirts, bathroom breaks, or adequate water for hours at a
time); Harmelin, 510 U.S. at 976 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“According to its terms … the Clause disables the
Legislature from authorizing … cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily
employed.”); Anthony Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The Original Meaning,
57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839-842 (1969).
56

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (acknowledging that Supreme Court's precedents in
noncapital Eighth Amendment context "have not been a model of clarity").
57

217 U.S. 349 (1910). Some earlier opinions had suggested a different view. In In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436 (1890), the Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to New York’s use of electrocution on the
ground that the amendment did not apply against the states. But it went on to hold that Kemmler’s due
process rights were not violated either, opining that
[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.

Id. at 447.
The Court sidestepped the issue in O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), which rejected an
Eighth Amendment challenge to a state sentence of over 54 years for bootlegging, again on the ground that
the Eighth Amendment did not bind the states. Id. at 332. However, three Justices urged in dissent that the
Eighth Amendment should apply to the case. They asserted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause prohibited “all punishments which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportioned
to the offenses charged.” Id. at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, the vast weight of pre-Weems lower court authority interpreting the Eighth
Amendment or related state constitutional provisions held that “cruel and unusual” or “cruel or unusual”
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Guard clerk in the Philippines, Weems was convicted of falsifying a single entry in a
government ledger.58 The Philippine penal code punished this offense with twelve to
twenty years in cadena temporal, a regime of penalties that originated in Spanish law.59
Prisoners were kept constantly shackled at the wrists and ankles and put to “hard and
painful labor.”60 They were also deprived of parental, family, and property rights during
the term of imprisonment (“civil interdiction”); barred for life from any position of public
trust (“perpetual absolute disqualification”); and subjected for life to “the surveillance of
the authorities,” which prohibited them from changing their residence without official
permission.61 Weems received a sentence of fifteen years in cadena temporal, which the
territorial supreme court affirmed.62
The Supreme Court chose to evaluate the sentence under the cruel and unusual
punishments clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, which was identical to the federal
Eighth Amendment.63 The court held that any sentence of cadena temporal within the
statutory range would be cruel and unusual punishment for Weems’s offense, and

meant only improper modes of punishment. Representative cases include Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019,
1020-21 (Ind. 1893); State v. White, 25 P. 33, 34-35 (Kan. 1890); Comm. v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. 482, 486
(1855). See also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 983-85 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Weems, 217 U.S. at 402-07 (White,
J., dissenting) (collecting authorities).
The Weems majority declined to make “an extended review of the cases in the state courts.” Id. at
377.
58

Id. at 357-58.

59

Id. at 358, 363-64, 368.

60

Id. at 364.

61

Id. at 364-65.

62

Id. at 358.

63

Id. at 365, 367. Weems had not raised below the argument that his sentence was cruel and unusual. Id.
at 362.
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dismissed the indictment against him.64 The Court’s opinion was elusive, ranging
broadly but difficult to pin down to any particular principle of decision.65 At times it
stressed the alien, unusual character of cadena temporal, and the harsh regime of physical
penalties and legal disabilities that it added to simple imprisonment.66 But other parts of
the majority opinion seemed to focus on the principle of proportionality, emphasizing
that “such penalties for such offenses amaze those who … believe that it is a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense,” and
asking, “[i]s this also a precept of the fundamental law?”67 The balance of the opinion
implied that the answer was yes.68
2.

The Originalist Critique in Weems

Two features of Weems impress the reader at a century’s distance. The first is the
strongly nonoriginalist theory of constitutional interpretation that underpins Justice

64

Id. at 366, 382. Justice McKenna wrote for a four-Justice majority. Justice Lurton did not participate.

65

Justice White’s dissent took note of this quality. See id. at 385 (White, J., dissenting) (“I find it
impossible to fix with precision the meaning which the court gives to [the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause].”).

66

See id. at 366 (“He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of
the criminal magistrate. … No circumstance of degradation is omitted. It may be that even the cruelty of
pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard
labor.”); 377 (“[T]he law under consideration … has no fellow in American legislation. Let us remember
that it has come to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours.”).
Of course, an interpretation of Weems that sought to base its holding of unconstitutionality on the
potentially “cruel and unusual” penalty of painful labor in perpetual chains, cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 99092 (opinion of Scalia, J.), would have to acknowledge that the use of chained labor gangs was not
unfamiliar to common-law jurisdictions of the era. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 411-12 (White, J., dissenting)
(citing nineteenth-century English criminal statute establishing different degrees of hard labor). Indeed,
some contemporary American jurisdictions have employed such punishments. See, e.g., Rick Bragg,
Alabama to Make Prisoners Break Rocks, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, at 5 (describing Alabama’s reinstitution of chained work gangs for prisoners).
67

Id. at 366-67.

68

See id. at 373 (“We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other
forms of punishment was overlooked [by the Framers].”); 379 (comparing “the mischief and the remedy”
in Weems’s sentence); Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910).
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McKenna’s majority opinion. Writing decades before the content of the Eighth
Amendment was judicially pegged to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,”69 McKenna stressed that:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. … In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been, but of what may be.70
Other language similarly reminds one that Weems was a contemporary of the famous due
process decision in Lochner v. New York.71 Justice McKenna, a member of the Lochner
majority, based his opinion in Weems on a general principle of broad interpretation of
constitutional guarantees, and specifically supported his view with the example of the
expansive “construction of the 14th Amendment” that theSupreme Court had employed
in the decades preceding Weems.72
The second notable trait of Weems is the powerful originalist analysis found in
Justice White’s dissenting opinion. White drew on English and founding-era history, as
well as nineteenth-century judicial authorities, to argue that the Eighth Amendment did
not authorize a general proportionality review of sentences.73

69

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

70

Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.

71

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

72

Weems, 217 U.S. at 374.

73

Indeed, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Harmelin, the locus classicus of conservative opposition to
proportionality review, restates many of the arguments and authorities found in Justice White’s Weems
dissent from 81 years before. Compare Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-985 (opinion of Scalia, J.) with Weems,
217 U.S. at 389-411 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice White noted that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment duplicated language in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.74 He concluded
that the historical impetus for the clause arose from abusive sentences handed down by
judges, particularly those in the trial of the notorious seventeenth-century perjurer Titus
Oates. The judges of King's Bench "t[ook] special care" of Oates byfashioning a novel
and vindictive sentence: he was to be "whipped from Newgate to Tyburn" by the
common hangman, then displayed annually in the pillories in different parts of London,
at times that corresponded to specific dates in Oates's perjured accounts of events.75 As
adopted by the colonies, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was, in Justice
White's view, principally a prohibition of cruel and barbarous modes of punishment. To
the extent it also had to do with the simple magnitude of punishments, the clause placed
limits on courts, but not (as the Weems majority held) on legislatures. In other words, it
was:
a direct and controlling prohibition upon the legislative branch (as well as all
other departments), restraining it from authorizing or directing the infliction of the
cruel bodily punishments of the past, which was one of the evils sought to be
prevented . . . by the English Bill of Rights, and also retrained the courts from
exerting and Congress from empowering them to select and exert by way of
discretion modes of punishment which were not usual, or usual modes of
punishment to a degree not usual, and which could alone be imposed by express
authority of law.76
White supplied voluminous supporting citations from nineteenth-century state
courts interpreting analogous provisions of their state constitutions.77 He concluded that

74

Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting).

75

Id. at 391 n.1, citing 10 Howell's State Trials 1227, 1316-17 (K.B. 1685).

76

Id. at 397 (White, J., dissenting).

77

Id. at 401-07 & n.3.
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no courts prior to Weems had taken the view that the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment set limits on the magnitude (rather than the kind)of legislative sanctions. 78
3.

Consequences

Weems offered uncertain guidance to the development of Eighth Amendment
sentencing law. The closest thing to astandard of review thatcould be gleaned from its
analysis was that sentences that“amaze[d]” federal judges were invalid.79 It was possible
to view the holding in Weems as turning on the case’s unusual facts – a sentence that
originated under a foreign code and encompassed a harsh array of additional penalties
beyond simple imprisonment. Perhaps for these reasons, Weems did not usher in a period
of constitutional review of prison sentencing.80
The issue of Eighth Am
endment noncapital review

did not become salient again

until the 1960s and 1970s, when some federal and state courts began to invoke Weems to
strike down prison sentences as disproportionate.81 During this period, the Fourth Circuit

78

Id. at 407-09.

79

Id. at 366. Later courts sometimes cited Weems as if it prefigured the “gross disproportionality” standard
that a majority of the Court eventually embraced. E.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (plurality opinion);
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788, 800 (1982).
Actually, it did not. When Weems is read without hindsight bias, it appears that the opaque
majority opinion merely noted – rather than adopted – Justice Field’s formulation that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited sentences “greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.” Weems, 217 U.S. at
371 (quoting O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting)) (punctuation omitted). Indeed, Weems’s
citation to the O’Neil dissent seems to be offered simply to illustrate the point that “[n]o case has occurred
in this court which has called for an exhaustive definition” of the Eighth Amendment’s scope. Id. (noting
that in O’Neil “the question was raised but not decided”).

80

In Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), the Court dismissively rejected an Eighth Amendment
proportionality challenge to a life sentence imposed on a three-time horse thief. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at
276-77 (describing the Graham litigation). Thereafter the Eighth Amendment noncapital proportionality
doctrine lay inert in the Supreme Court for several decades. See Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 378, 386-87 (1980). Schwartz’s article gives a detailed discussion of Eighth Amendment
sentencing law in the lower courts between Weems and Rummel.
81

See Schwartz, supra note 80, at 396-406. Of course, this was a period of active Supreme Court
decisionmaking in capital cases under the Eighth Amendment. The Court declared most then-existing
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devised an influential four-factor test for proportionality in Hart v. Coiner.82 These
decisions formed the backdrop to the Supreme Court’s next major encounter with
noncapital proportionality review, which came in 1980.
B.

Vestigial Scrutiny
1.

Rummel v. Estelle

Rummel v. Estelle83 was the first Supreme Court case squarely to present the
question whether a simple sentence of imprisonment could be unconstitutionally
disproportionate. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-Justice majority,84 took a skeptical
view. Rummel’s narrow holding was important enough: the Court upheld a mandatory
life sentence (with potential parole after 12 years) imposed under a Texas recidivist
statute on Rummel, who was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses after two
convictions for equally minor, but felonious frauds.85

death penalty statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), on the ground that the
“freakish” and unpredictable imposition of the death sentence rendered it cruel and unusual. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) later upheld the constitutionality of a new generation of state death
penalty statutes revised in light of Furman. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), the majority
explicitly applied a “gross proportionality” analysis to capital sentencing and held that it was per se cruel
and unusual punishment to impose death for the rape of an adult woman.
The Court decided one notable noncapital proportionality case in the period. In Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court squarely endorsed the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment
against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson held it an Eighth Amendment violation to
impose any criminal punishment on a defendant for being addicted to narcotics. However, Robinson’s
holding shed little light on what penalties were allowable for activities that could be punished as crimes.
82

483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (invalidating a life sentence imposed under recidivist statute on defendant
whose three felony convictions were for perjury and minor check fraud). The Hart test required courts to
weigh: (1) the seriousness of the triggering offense; (2) interjurisdictional comparisons (i.e., comparing the
defendant’s penalty to that imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense); (3) intrajurisdictional
comparisons (comparing the defendant’s crime with the other crimes assigned a similar penalty in the
defendant’s jurisdiction); and (4) the legislative purpose behind the sentence imposed. Id. at 140-42.
83

445 U.S. 263 (1980).

84

Justice Stewart concurred in a brief opinion. Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens.

85

Id. at 264-66, 280. A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit had voted to grant Rummel habeas relief from his
sentence under the proportionality analysis of Hart v. Coiner, see 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). The court
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Of even greater interest was the majority’s mode of analysis. In one voice, Justice
Rehnquist set aside Weems as turning on “the unique nature of the punishments” there,
and stressed the Court’s “reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment.”86 He explicitly linked this cautious approach to Eighth Amendment
review of prison terms with the Court's cautious approach to substantive due process
review under the Fourteenth Amendment, invoking Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent for
the proposition that the Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing
views."87 The Rummel opinion was salted with suggestions thatproportionality review of
prison terms simply did not exist, except perhaps in cases involving misdemeanors:
[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies …
the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative.88
However, in other portions of its opinion, the Rummel Court offered some scraps
of proportionality reasoning. It noted that heightened penalties for recidivism were
constitutionally permissible and stated that “a proper assessment of Texas’s treatment of
Rummel” would take the availability of parole into account. The Court endorsed the
view that Rummel’s punishment could be predicated on a combination of different
philosophical grounds, including the utilitarian interests of deterring and incapacitating
en banc vacated that opinion and affirmed denial of the writ. 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally
Schwartz, supra note 80, at 412-420 (giving an overview of the Rummel litigation and the arguments
raised; concluding that in rejecting Rummel's claim, "the Supreme Court . . . reached a fair resolution of [a]
difficult constitutional problem.").
86

Id. at 274. Justice Rehnquist’s opposition in Rummel to searching judicial review of prison sentences
rested on noninterpretive, pragmatic grounds. His opinion said little about the text or history of the Eighth
Amendment. The Rummel majority did not revisit the originalist critique of proportionality review that
Justice White had offered in Weems.
87

Id. at 282, quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

88

Id.
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recidivists as well as the purely retributive interest in punishing his triggering offense.89
In an important but equivocal footnote, the majority conceded that “extreme” noncapital
sentences such as life imprisonment for overtime parking might be invalid under the
Eighth Amendment.90 In fact, in another passage, the majority declined to express a view
on the rather less theoretical question of whether Rummel could have been
constitutionally sentenced to life imprisonment for his $120 fraud if it had been his first
offense.91
Four Justices dissented, arguing that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted
to prohibit "grossly excessive punishments" in noncapital cases, even when the mode of
punishment employed was not barbarous or torturous, and that Rummel's sentence
violated this standard.92 In judging whether a sentence was grossly excessive, the
dissenters would have looked to "the nature of the offense" and to inter- and
intrajurisdictional comparisons of the punishments for similar offenses.93 In the end, the
dissenters concluded that Rummel's "mandatory life sentence for defrauding persons of
about $230" (in three offenses) "crosse[d] any rationally drawn line" marking the limits

89

Id. at 276, 284 (“The purpose[s] of a recidivist statute such as that involved here … are to deter repeat
offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to
be classified as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time.”).

90

See id. at 274 n.11.

91

Id. at 276. This hypothetical is not far from the facts of the later case of Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d
706 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that life sentence without parole was cruel and unusual punishment for selling
a quarter of a gram of cocaine, the defendant’s first offense).
92

Rummel, 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting).

93

Id. at 295.
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of proper punishment, and "would be viewed as grossly unjust by virtually every layman
or lawyer."94
2.

Hutto v. Davis

Scarcely a year later, the Rummel majority echoed Rummel’s deferential analysis
in Hutto v. Davis.95 A Virginia jury gave Davis consecutive twenty-year sentences for
each of two criminal counts: one for distributing marijuana, and one forpossessin g it
with intent to distribute. The result was a forty-year sentence for about nine ounces of
contraband.96 Davis had a criminal record,97 but his sentence was not premised on any
finding of recidivism.98 The en banc Fourth Circuit struck the sentence as cruel and
unusual.99 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Rummel, which had just been decided.100 On remand the Fourth Circuit stuck by its
judgment, affirming without opinion by the vote of an equally divided court.101
The Supreme Court then summarily reversed in a tart per curiam opinion that
suggested the authorship of Justice Rehnquist or Chief Justice Burger. To the five-Justice
majority, Rummel stood for the near-total rejection ofEighth Amendment scrutiny of
terms of imprisonment. The majority did not weigh the facts of Davis’s crime and

94

Id. at 307.

95

454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).

96

Id. at 370-71.

97

See id. at 375, 379 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).

98

See id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

99

Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153, 154 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).

100

Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).

101

Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981).
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sentence or compare them with the facts of Rummel. Rather, it stated that Rummel had
“distinguished between punishments – such as the death penalty – which by their very
nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and
punishments [such as imprisonment] which differ from others only in duration.”102 It
glossed Rummel as holding that “the excessiveness of one prison term as compared to
another is invariably a subjective determination,” implying that meaningful judicial
review was impossible.103 Indeed, the majority impliedly accused the Fourth Circuit of
judicial mutiny for entertaining a contestable disproportionality claim in the wake of
Rummel.104
This reading of Rummel threatened to move beyond deferential review to a full
repudiation of Weems. Yet as in Rummel, the majority could notquitebring itself to
forswear a minimal form of rationality review. A footnote in Davis repeated the
concession in Rummel that life imprisonment for overtime parking might be
unconstitutional.105
As in Rummel, four Justices took a sharply different view. Justice Powell wrote
a reluctant concurrence that rested entirely on Rummel’s stare decisis effect.106 Justice

102

Davis, 454 U.S. at 373.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 374-75 (“[T]he Court of Appeals could be viewed as having ignored, consciously or
unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Constitution. … [U]nless we wish
anarchy to prevail within the judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower
federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”).

105

Id. at 374 n.3.

106

Id. at 375, 379 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell complained that Rummel would
now “often … compe[l]” lower courts “to accept sentences that arguably are cruel and unusual.” Id. at 377.
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Brennan, in dissent, disputed the majority’s interpretation of Rummel as precluding
significant proportionality review of sentences.107
Rummel and Davis appeared to leave Eighth Amendment noncapital
proportionality review in roughly the same placeas Cold War-era review of economic
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. In principle a vestigial power of judicial
review was acknowledged for wildly inappropriate state action, but in practice the courts
were to have little or nothing to do.108 Yet italso appeared that this understanding of the
Eighth Amendment hung by one vote on the Supreme Court. The reader’s views of a
lower court's obligations in such a situation will determine her reaction to the fact that
less than a year later, the Eighth Circuit struck down as cruel and unusual a life sentence
imposed on a seven-time felony recidivist, Jerry Helm.109 Helm’s case reached the
Supreme Court, where it produced both a significant holding and a swing away from the
minimal-rationality conception of noncapital sentencing review.
D.

Substantive Scrutiny: Solem v. Helm

107

Id. at 381-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Stevens joined this opinion. Justice
Brennan condemned what he considered “a serious and improper expansion of Rummel” by the majority.
Id. at 382-83. He characterized the per curiam opinion as a “complete abdication of our responsibility to
enforce the Eighth Amendment,” and asserted that Davis’s sentence was “obvious[ly]” cruel and unusual.
Id. at 383-84.

108

See Grossman, supra note 13, at 122 (Davis "appeared to foreclose virtually any proportionality
challenge in a non-capital case."); David S. Mackey, Rationality versus Proportionality: Reconsidering the
Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sanctions, 51 TENN. L. REV. 623, 631 (1984). Compare Gerald Gunther
and Kathleen Sullivan, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479-81 (13th ed. 1997) (reviewing the Cold War-era
substantive due process cases and asking whether they amounted to a "total withdrawal from review").
109

Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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In Solem v. Helm,110 the Court held, five to four, that a judge-imposed sentence of
life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual punishment for uttering a “no
account” check for $100, Helm’s seventh felony.
Under Rummel and Davis, Helm’s claim should have failed.111 His triggering
offense was virtually identical to Rummel’s and his recidivist history was considerably
worse. Rummel’s only prior felonies were two small-time frauds; in contrast, Helm had
six prior felonies, including relatively dangerous crimes such as drunk driving and three
separate convictions for nonresidential burglary.112 The chief point in Helm’s favor was
that his judge-imposed life sentence precluded the possibility of parole, whereas Rummel
had been eligible for parole in 12 years under the operation of the Texas recidivist statute.
However, Davis seemed to foreclose relief on this basis with its flat statement that “the
excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective
determination.”113 Helm’s sentence was also heavier than that available in any other
jurisdiction except Nevada.114 But Rummel and Davis had squarely rejected the use of
interjurisdictional comparisons in noncapital cases to establish an Eighth Amendment
violation.115 Finally, Helm’s triggering fraud, while hardly earth-shattering, was an

110

463 U.S. 277 (1983).

111

Cf. id. at 304, 311 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s holding cannot be rationally reconciled with
Rummel. … [Davis] makes crystal clear that under Rummel it is error for appellate courts to second-guess
… whether a given sentence of imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime.”); Grossman, supra note
13, at 128 (Solem Court’s attempt to distinguish Rummel and Davis was “unpersuasive”); Joshua Dressler,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.05[C] at 47 (1995) (Helm’s claim seemed “weak” in light of
Rummel).
112

Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-280.

113

Davis, 454 U.S. at 373 (per curiam).

114

Solem, 463 U.S. at 298-300.

115

Davis, 454 U.S. at 373; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-82.
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example of genuine criminal conduct, malum in se, which distinguished his case from the
extreme “no life imprisonment for overtime parking” hypothetical discussed in Rummel
and Davis.116
There was another stark difference between Rummel and Solem that one might
have expected to feature more prominently in the Solem Court's opinion. While the life
sentence in Rummel was specifically commanded by the Texas recidivism statute,117 the
South Dakota recidivism statute in Solem left Helm's sentence entirely at the discretion of
a single trial judge, who could have sentenced Helm to any number of years for his
triggering offense of passing a $100 bad check, but chose to impose the maximum
possible sentence of life without parole.118 Helm's harsh sentence thus resulted not from
a categorical judgment by the legislature, but from the discretionary (and arguably
arbitrary) action of a single decisionmaker.119
At the level of Court personnel, Solem came out as it did because Justice
Blackmun abandoned the coalition of Justices that had decided Rummel and Davis,
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See Davis, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11.
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See id. at 264 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE, art. 63 (1973), recodified as TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d)
(1974)) ("Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony . . . shall on such third conviction be
imprisoned for life in the penitentiary").
118

See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281 & n.6 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(2), 22-7-8 (1979)) (providing
that punishment for a fourth felony conviction is automatically "enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1
felony," which is punishable by a discretionary sentence up to life in prison without parole).
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The Solem Court reproduced the trial judge's colloquy with Helm at sentencing:
I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and
the record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that the only prudent thing to do is
to lock you up for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of your crimes,
just be coming back before courts. You'll have plenty of time to think this one over.

463 U.S. at 282-83, quoting State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 500 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting)
(quoting Seventh Judicial Circuit Court, Pennington County, South Dakota).
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providing a fifth vote for Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court.120 Atthe level of
doctrine, Solem reflected a temporary swing back to the more ambitious passages in
Weems, that is, an attempt to reconceptualize Eighth Amendment sentencing law as a
form of substantive scrutiny closely focused on retributive proportionality.
Justice Powell's Solem opinion embraced wholesale the three proportionality
criteria rejected in Rummel and Davis: analysis of "the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty"; of "the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction"; and of "the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions."121 The Solem opinion included several dramatic passages, as if to set the
stage for future expansion of Eighth Amendment review. In several places Justice Powell
abandoned the more restrained "gross disproportionality" standard that he had urged in
Rummel, and claimed instead a broad power to invalidate "sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed."122 Powell also classified all of Helm’s six
prior felony offenses as “nonviolent,”123 though this was surely a questionable
characterization of Helm's conviction for three-time drunk driving.124
Chief Justice Burger and three other Justices joined an indignant dissent, arguing
that Solem's "holding cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel," and stressing the
120

Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens also joined Justice Powell’s opinion.
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Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
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Id. at 284; see id. at 290 ("[W]e hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted"); cf. id. at 303 (holding that Helm's
"sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.").
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Id. at 279.
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See id. at 280; cf. id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I reject the fiction that all Helm's crimes were
innocuous or nonviolent. Among his felonies were three burglaries and a third conviction for drunken
driving. By comparison Rummel was a relatively 'model citizen.'").
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perceived affront the Court had administered to the doctrine of stare decisis.125 Burger
also challenged the majority’s classification of Helm’s nonresidential burglary and
repeated drunk driving convictions as “nonviolent.”126
Solem's broad statement that "disproportionate" sentences were unconstitutional
presented the prospect of a generalized constitutional appellate review of state court
prison sentences.127 Such a view would have given a thoroughly substantive cast to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. It would interpret it as incorporating a specific,
debatable value judgment about penology that would displace contrary legislative
approaches, even those adopted and pursued in good faith, much as the First Amendment
incorporates a substantive judgment about the costs and benefits of speech regulation that
displaces contrary judgments by the states. In Fourteenth Amendment terms, Justice
Powell's vision of constitutional sentencing review elevated it either to the tier of
heightened scrutiny under the Carolene Products framework, or (in light of some of the
more conciliatory passages sprinkled in the Solem opinion), to the more indefinite but
still intrusive brand of scrutiny exemplified by Lochner. However, this vision of the
Eighth Amendment has not prevailed.
E.

Rationality Review: Harmelin v. Michigan
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Id.; see id. at 305-312 (arguing that the holding in Solem was inconsistent with Rummel and Davis); id.
at 315 ("If we are to have a system of laws, not men, Rummel is controlling."); 317 ("It is . . . curious that
the Court should brush aside controlling precedents that are barely in the bound volumes of the United
States Reports.").
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Id. at 316 ("It is sheer fortuity that the places respondent burglarized were unoccupied and that he killed
no pedestrians while behind the wheel. . . Four of respondent's crimes, I repeat, had harsh potentialities for
violence.").
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See id. at 315 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing fear that "[t]o require appellate review of all
sentences of imprisonment . . . will 'administer the coup de grace to the courts of appeals as we know
them.'") (quoting Henry Friendly, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 36 (1973)).
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After three major (and conflicting) opinions in three years, the Supreme Court left
the Eighth Amendment issue alone for a time. The lower courts gave Solem a cool
reception. Despite the potentially broad standard articulated in the case, no federal court
of appeals (and only a handful of state courts) set aside a prison sentence on Eighth
Amendment grounds in the eight years following Solem.128 This caution was wellfounded. When, eight years later, a splintered Court next confronted the problem of
noncapital proportionality review in Harmelin v. Michigan,129 it altered Solem doctrinally
and scaled back its scope of review.
Harmelin is the key modern Eighth Amendment sentencing case. Though it
yielded only a plurality opinion, it provided the constitutional standard that governs
today.130 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion went further than any previous opinion had
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See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1015-16 & n.2 (White, J., dissenting). One must conclude that the lower
courts did not take the bolder passages of Justice Powell’s Solem opinion at face value. Granted, Solem
declined to overrule the narrow holdings of Rummel and Davis, and those cases had upheld strict sentences.
It nevertheless strains credulity to think that no court of appeals, on habeas review or otherwise, confronted
a prison sentence that was “disproportionate” to the crime, and distinguishable from Rummel and Davis, in
the eight years between Solem and Harmelin. Cf. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 303.
Professors Brannon Denning and Glenn Reynolds identify a pattern in which the lower federal
courts sometimes hesitate to give full effect to a new decision that promises a burdensome expansion of
judicial review. Full enforcement may not follow until the Supreme Court reiterates its commitment to the
new principle in later rulings. See Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance:
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003).
Denning and Reynolds’s guiding example is the current reluctance of the lower federal courts to engage in
meaningful review of legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause, despite the Supreme Court’s
embrace of such review in United States v. Lopez, 519 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 568 (2000). See Denning and Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance, supra, 55 ARK. L. REV. at 1254-56.
Solem’s cool reception in the 1980s may reflect an institutional resistance by the lower courts
similar to the one that, in Denning and Reynolds’s view, characteries Lopez.
129

501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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Later pluralities of the Supreme Court, and virtually all lower courts, have held that Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Harmelin, as the opinion that concurred in the judgment reached but also recognized at least
some degree of sentencing review under the Eighth Amendment, contains the ratio decidendi of the case.
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 (plurality opinion); Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2001)
("apply[ing] the principles outlined in Mr. Justice Kennedy's opinion" in Harmelin); Hawkins v. Hargett,
200 F.3d 1279, 282 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998);
Dressler, supra note 111, at 49. See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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in assimilating the structure of noncapital proportionality review under the Eighth
Amendment to thatof Fourteenth Amendment rationality review.
Ronald Harmelin had no criminal record. He was found in Detroit with 672
grams of cocaine and a variety of drug paraphernalia, and convicted of simple possession
of illegal drugs in an amount greater than 650 grams.131 Under Michigan law, this
offense carried a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole –
the most severe punishment authorized in Michigan.132 Harmelin unsuccessfully sought
relief in the state courts on the ground that his sentence was cruel and unusual. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the sentence, five Justices to four.
Under Solem, Harmelin’s legal claim should have prevailed. Solem had expressly
classified Helm’s convictions for drunk driving and nonresidential burglary as
“nonviolent” offenses, treating them as relatively less serious than “violent” offenses.133
By this standard, Harmelin’s passive possession of contraband had at least as attenuated a
connection to possible incidents of violence as Helm’s felonies. Moreover, while the
Supreme Court in Davis had approved stiff sentences (well shortof life without parole)
for individual counts of drug trafficking,134 Harmelin had not been charged with
distribution of drugs, or even with possession with intent to distribute.135 He was a
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See id. at 961 & n.1 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7403(2)(a)(i),
333.7403(2)(a)(1) (West 1990-91)).
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Id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting).
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See Solem, 463 U.S. at 279.
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Davis, 454 U.S. at 375 (upholding twenty years for each of two counts of distributing marijuana and
possessing with intent to distribute).
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Michigan, like most jurisdictions, separately criminalizes the possession of drugs with intent to
distribute. Under the state’s drug laws, simple possession above 650 grams then carried the same penalty
(life without parole) as possession with intent to distribute. Prosecutors deliberately chose to charge
Harmelin with simple possession to ease their burden at trial. See id. at 1025 (White, J., dissenting).
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simple possessor. Nor could any interest in combating recidivism justify his punishment,
as was true in Rummel: Harmelin was a first-time offender. Finally, Harmelin also had a
powerful case under the two comparative factors announced in Solem. The Michigan
penal code punished Harmelin’s possessory offense more severely than rape, armed
robbery or second degree murder;136 and Harmelin’s sentence was harsher than any that
he could have received for his offense in another state.137 It is difficult to dispute that
Harmelin’s sentence satisfied Solem's standard.138 And not one Justice claimed
otherwise. Instead, the five Justices who voted to affirm Harmelin’s sentence decided the
case under different constitutional standards than those announced in Solem.
1.

Justice Scalia’s Restatement of the Originalist Critique

Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court in an extensive opinion joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Rehnquist’s opinion in Rummel had tried to minimize the
reach of Eighth Amendment proportionality review using pragmatic and case law-based
arguments. Justice Scalia now reached back to fundamentals, arguing from text and
history that Solem (and behind it, Weems) were “simply wrong: the Eighth Amendment
136

Id. at 1025-26 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that all three of these offenses carried more lenient
sentencing ranges than the mandatory life sentence for Harmelin’s crime).
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Id. at 1026 (noting that the next harshest state, Alabama, imposed a mandatory life sentence without
parole only upon conviction for possession of at least 10 kilograms of cocaine).
138

See Dressler, supra note 111, at 48 (Harmelin had a "strong case of unconstitutionality" under Solem);
but see Woodburn, supra note 18, at 1940-42 (arguing that Harmelin’s sentence was constitutional under
the Solem framework because of “the gravity of drug-related social problems,” especially given that he
possessed cocaine in commercial quantities).
Woodburn identifies utilitarian social concerns. These certainly suggest why a rational legislature
might decide in good faith to establish fierce mandatory punishments for first-time cocaine possession –
which would satisfy the modified constitutional standard that Justice Kennedy announced in Harmelin. But
Woodburn does not show how this reasoning could be reconciled with Solem’s original, broad conception
of “nonviolent” crimes. If repeated drunken driving is, as a matter of law, a “relatively minor” offense that
is not a “crime against a person,” Solem, 463 U.S. at 297, how could one say with any confidence that the
simple possession of a bag of contraband is sufficiently “grave” and "violent" to justify a life sentence
without parole? Harmelin’s result, while correct, was not legally compatible with the Solem opinion.

34

contains no proportionality principle.”139 Instead, in his view, the Eighth Amendment
invalidates only "particular forms or 'modes' of punishment — specifically, cruel methods
of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed."140
Justice Scalia's originalist argument rested on three sources of evidence: the
English history that gave rise to the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the 1689
Bill of Rights; the history surrounding the Eighth Amendment's adoption in 1791; and
nineteenth-century judicial interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
The first of these sources proved to give only equivocal support to Justice Scalia's
position. As he recognized, the leading impetus for the 1689 clause was the conduct of
the Court of King's Bench in the trial of Titus Oates and other prominent state trials.141
What prompted outrage, Scalia claimed, was the "arbitrary sentencing power" claimed by
Chief Justice Jeffreys, who crafted special sentences to punish perceived enemies of the
crown.142 The defect in Oates's sentence was that it involved punishments "out of the
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J.). It is curious that Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion
nowhere mentions its most prominent predecessor, Justice White's dissent in Weems. The two opinions,
eight decades apart, canvass virtually identical historical evidence and offer many of the same arguments.
Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 382-413 (White, J., dissenting) with Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-85 (opinion
of Scalia, J.).
Perhaps Justice Scalia was uncomfortable with Justice White's conclusion that, while the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause had no application to legislatively enacted penalties
such as those before the Court in Weems, it might be applicable in some fashion to judge-imposed
penalties. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 397 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that Eighth Amendment
"restrain[s] the courts from exerting and Congress from empowering them, to select and exert by way of
discretion modes of punishment which were not usual, or usual modes of punishment to a degree not usual,
and which could alone be imposed by express authority of law.").
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Id. at 976.
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Id. at 968-975.
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Id. at 968. Justice Scalia quoted Justice Withins's remark to Oates that "we have taken special care of
you." Id. at 970, quoting Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 Howell's State Trials 1227, 1316 (K.B. 1685).
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Judges' Power."143 Some of the elements of Oates's sentence, such as defrocking, could
only be administered by an ecclesiastical court. Other punishments, such as prolonged
scourging (indeed, the judges may have intended that Oates be scourged to death), were
viewed as contrary to common law practice for misdemeanor offenses such as Oates's
perjuries.144 The members of the House of Commons who sought (unsuccessfully) to
overturn Oates's sentence were motivated by the judges' "Pretence to a discretionary
Power" to "inflict what Punishment they pleased."145 In Justice Scalia's view, then, the
furor over Oates's trial did not principally emphasize the extreme or disproportionate
nature of the sanctions imposed, but rather the imposition of punishments not authorized
by common law tradition or statute.146
At the same time, Justice Scalia obliquely acknowledged that none of the
individual modes of punishment employed in Oates's sentence – defrocking, whipping,
pillorying, fines, imprisonment – were illegal at the time, and they were not prohibited
by statute for many years thereafter.147 Moreover, Justice Scalia's opinion quoted the
dissenting minority of the House of Lords, who condemned Oates's sentence not only for
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Id. at 973, quoting the dissenting report of the minority of the House of Lords, 1 H.L. JOUR. 367 (May
31, 1689).
144

Id. at 971-72.
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Id. at 973, quoting 10 H.C. JOUR. 247 (Aug. 2, 1689).
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See Granucci, supra note 55, at 859 (concluding that "[i]n the context of . . . Oates's case, 'cruel and
unusual' seems to have meant a severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction
of the court to impose.").
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 143 (2004); Granucci, supra no
te 55, at 855 -56, 859 ("It is
clear that no [blanket] prohibition on methods of punishment was intended" by the 1689 Bill of Rights).
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being "contrary to Law and ancient practice," but also as "barbarous, inhuman, and
unchristian."148
Early American history more clearly supported Justice Scalia's view. The few
references in the ratification debates to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
viewed it as prohibiting torturous or barbarous punishments.149 Indeed, a leading
scholarly treatment, cited extensively by Justice Scalia, concluded that the Framers were
led by an "unjustified reading" of the English Bill of Rights provision to view the words
"cruel and unusual" as "proscrib[ing] not excessive but torturous punishments."150
Justice Scalia also noted that the federal criminal code enacted by the first Congress,
immediately contemporary with the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, did not seem to
recognize a proportionality principle, as it provided for numerous harsh penalties,
including death by hanging for counterfeiting government securities and for stealing fifty
dollars worth of goods from a vessel.151
Finally, Justice Scalia examined early American case law interpreting the Eighth
Amendment. Mostnineteenth century courts interpreted it as a limitation on the modes

148

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971 (opinion of Scalia, J.), quoting 1 H.L. JOUR. 367 (May 31, 1689).
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Id. at 979-80. Delegates to the 1788 Massachusetts convention objected that the new government was
"nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments . . . and there is no
constitutional check on [it], but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of [its]
discipline." 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1854). Patrick Henry
argued before the Virginia Convention that "your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not . . .
inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would not
admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment." 3 Elliot, id., at 447. George Mason reassured the
Virginians that the federal Bill of Rights would prohibit torture because, like their own bill of rights, it
provided, "that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore torture was included in the
prohibition." 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1085 (R. Rutland ed. 1970); see generally Granucci, supra note
55, at 839-42; Schwartz, supra note 80, at 382.
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Granucci, supra note 55, at 865; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975, 979 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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Id. at 980-81, citing 1 Stat. 114-15 (1790).

37

of bodily punishment the legislature could use, not on the proportionality of
punishments.152
Justice Scalia's opinion also offered pragmatic criticism of the approach to
judicial proportionality review suggested in Solem. He contended that courts could not
adequately administer a test that required them to gauge the "inherent gravity" of a given
offense compared to other offenses,153 nor could they perform meaningful
intrajurisdictional comparisons, because of the parallel difficulty of identifying which
offenses are "similar" in gravity to a given offense.154 He concluded that "the
proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective values."155
In closing, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court's modern death penalty
jurisprudence did not conform to the rule thathe supported for noncapital cases like
Harmelin's.156 The Court has engaged in robust "proportionality" review, squarely so
called, in the capital punishment field.157 Indeed, Justice Byron White's dissent in
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Id. at 982-85.
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Id. at 987-88 (arguing that, with respect to the "gravity" of Harmelin's possession of a significant
quantity of cocaine, "[t]he members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the
streets of Detroit.").
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Id. at 988-89. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the third factor endorsed in Solem, interjurisdictional
comparisons of the punishment for a given offense in different jurisdictions, was properly administrable by
courts. However, he viewed this factor as of "no conceivable relevance to the Eighth Amendment." Id. at
989 ("That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish with the mildest
of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may criminalize an act that other States
do not criminalize at all. . . . Diversity not only in policy, but in the means of implementing policy, is the
very raison d'etre of our federal system.").
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Id. at 986.
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Id. at 993-94.
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See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding death penalty for murder is unconstitutionally
disproportionate when imposed on mildly mentally retarded defendant); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982) (death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for felony murder without intent to kill); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for rape of an adult
woman).
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Harmelin, though offering only a desultory response to Justice Scalia's arguments about
the historical meaning of the Eighth Amendment,158 effectively criticized the tension that
Scalia's position created between noncapital and capital cases.159 Justice Scalia stood on
the position that proportionality was not "a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment
law," but was "one of several respects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and
have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides."160
2.

Justice Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion

In the pivotal opinion in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor
and Souter, concurred in part with Justice Scalia and concurred in the judgment, but
parted ways with Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Court should entirely abandon the
constitutional review of prison sentences. Declining to take sides in the historical debate
between Justices Scalia and White, Kennedy concluded that “stare decisis counsels our
adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that has existed in our Eighth

158

Justice White pointed out that one nineteenth century commentator had stated that "it would seem that
imprisonment for an unreasonable length of time" was contrary to "the spirit of the constitution."
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1010 (White, J., dissenting), quoting B. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN 185-86 (1832). Justice White also noted that at one point in his influential historical analysis of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the English Bill of Rights, Anthony Granucci posited that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments included "a reiteration of the English policy against
disproportionate penalties." Id. at 1011 n.1, quoting Granucci, supra note 55, at 860. However, as Justice
Scalia pointed out, Granucci's conclusion on this score is difficult to explain in light of the rest of his
analysis. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975 n.5 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
Granucci notes that the English penal law of the time authorized violent death and harsh bodily
punishments for numerous offenses, and that, if anything, this tendency worsened in the eighteenth century
after the adoption of the English Bill of Rights. Granucci, supra note 55, at 855-56, 859. He catalogs the
actual objections to the proceedings in King's Bench which gave rise to the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, and while there was an occasional leitmotif of objection to the severity of punishments imposed in
the trial of Titus Oates and others, the principal objection was clearly to the legally unauthorized nature of
the punishments inflicted. Id. at 859. Other commentators have also criticized Granucci's en passant
historical argument for proportionality review. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra no
te 80, at 380-81.
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Id. at 1012-14, 1018 (White, J, dissenting).
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Id. at 994 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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Amendment jurisprudence for 80 years."161 The plurality declined to overrule the
holding of Weems thatsome noncapital sentences may violate the Eighth Amendment .162
However, it substantially reformulated the proportionality analysis of Solem, jettisoning
Solem's standard of "significant disproportionality" and scaling back to a mode of review
that would invalidate only rare sentences marked by grave disproportionality.
As defined by the Harmelin plurality, Eighth Amendment sentencing review has
four salient characteristics.
1. Review is highly limited. Only "extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime" violate the Eighth Amendment.163 The courts' review is
"narrow," and thus easy for the state to satisfy.164 Indeed, the Harmelin plurality, in
upholding Harmelin's life sentence for possession of hard drugs in commercial quantity,
observed that "a rational basis exist[ed] for Michigan to conclude" that his crime was as
serious as felony murder. The plurality seemed to view this as sufficient to justify the
sentence.165
2. Respect for moral diversity among jurisdictions. One of the plurality's most
important conclusions was that "the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of
any one penological theory."166 Justice Kennedy identified the four basic goals of
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion).
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Id. at 997-98.
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Id. at 1001.

164

Id. at 997.
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Id. at 1004.
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Id. at 999.
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criminal punishment— retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation 167 —
and acknowledged that the weight that different jurisdictions give to these principles has
understandably "varied with the times."168 Eighth Amendment sentencing review, then,
is not about ensuring a close conformity of the offense of conviction with the reviewing
court's assessment of retributively proper punishment. States may give strong weight to
incapacitation and deterrence as well.169 This holding shed retrospective light on
Rummel, and prospective light on the Court's later holding in Ewing, likeRummel a
recidivism case.
3. A challenger must satisfy a significant initial burden before the court will
engage in weighing evidence. Harmelin's clearest doctrinal departure from Solem was its
refusal to apply to Harmelin's sentence the intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional
comparisons that Solem had applied as a threshold matter. Noting that Solem "appeared
to apply a different analysis than in Rummel and Davis,"170 the plurality held that such
comparisons "are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the
crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality."171 If the court can inspect the sentence on its face and infer a
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The federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which authorized the promulgation of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, identifies these as the four goals that underlie punishment in the federal justice system. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989); see also United States v. Booker,
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that federal courts are not bound by the federal sentencing guidelines, but
must consider them in imposing sentence, and that departures from the guidelines must be reasonable).
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Id., quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).
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See id. (observing that "marked divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length
of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure.").
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Id. at 998.
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Id. at 1005.
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justification that renders it not grossly disproportionate, then the sentence is constitutional
without further inquiry.172
4. Attention to whether substantive outcomes suggest procedural defects.
Harmelin involved a mandatory penalty of life without parole that the Michigan
legislature had chosen for the precise conduct in which Harmelin engaged. Unlike
Solem, where Helm's harsh life sentence resulted from the almost completely unguided
discretionary decision of a single trial judge, Harmelin thus involved the "collective
wisdom of the Michigan Legislature and, as a consequence, the Michigan citizenry."173
Justice Kennedy's opinion gave weight to this factor as a basisfor distinguishing Solem,
stressing that "[w]e have never invalidated a penalty mandated by a legislature based only
on the length of sentence," and "we should do so only in the most extreme
circumstance."174 Yet this difference between Solem and Harmelin had to do strictly with
the procedure that yielded the sentences in question. The bottom line, life without
parole, was identical in each case.175
The reader will, of course, have noticed that the four characteristics just described
parallel the ones previously used to define Fourteenth Amendment rationality review.176
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See id. ("In light of the gravity of petitioner's offense, a comparison of his crime with his sentence does
not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, and comparative analysis of his sentence with
others in Michigan and across the Nation need not be performed.").
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Id. at 1006.
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Id. at 1006-07.
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Others have noted that the holdings in Solem and Harmelin suggest that the Court gives weight to the
distinction between penalties required by general legislation and those imposed as a result of unguided
individual discretion. See Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 890 (2004) (arguing that "the central appeal of
Helm's claim was that he was the victim of a draconian judge.").
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See supra text accompanying notes 38 to 48.
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Despite its use of the language of "proportionality" review (or rather, "gross
disproportionality" review), the Harmelin plurality is best read as assimilating the
structure of Eighth Amendment sentencing review to that of general Fourteenth
Amendment due process review. The principle animating judicialreview in each context
is as much procedural as substantive, hence the differential treatment of mandatory
legislative sentences and discretionary judge-imposed ones. As long as the sentencing
system in a given state is working properly and evenhandedly, Justice Kennedy's opinion
suggests, the federal courts will almost never intervene on the basis of simple
disagreement with a state's policy choices. Instead, the federal courts seek to identify
individual arbitrary and capricious exercises of state power that suggest official abuse of
the authority to punish.
F.

Ewing v. California: Rationality Review Revisited

It may seem strange to speak of a splintered 2-3-4 decision as a source of relative
stability in a troubled area of the law, but that is how Ewing v. California177 should be
viewed. For the first time in over twenty years, the Supreme Court decided two
successive Eighth Amendment sentencing cases under the same doctrinal framework.178
Both in words and in fact, the Ewing plurality adhered to and clarified the rational basis
standard articulated by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin.
1.

177

Background

538 U.S. 11 (2003).

178

If one limits the field to argued decisions (Davis was a summary reversal), and views Rummel as a legal
departure from Weems, then the Court had never decided two successive noncapital sentencing cases under
the same legal framework until Ewing followed Harmelin.
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Ewing arose from the application of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out”
law, a tough recidivism statute adopted by legislation and popular referendum in 1994.179
The “Three Strikes” statutory scheme doubles the sentence of any felony offender who is
found to have been convicted of one prior serious or violent felony. For felony offenders
with at least two serious or violent prior felonies, the statute mandates an indeterminate
life sentence without the possibility of parole for at least 25 years, for each new felony
conviction.180 When a two-time violent or serious offender is convicted of multiple
felonies, each “third strike” produces a separate 25-to-life sentence, which must be served
consecutively.181 The third, triggering strike can be any felony.182
The scheme, as interpreted by the state courts, incorporates the exercise of
prosecutorial and judicial discretion in several respects. Trial courts may vacate
allegations of qualifying prior strikes if they conclude that the circumstances do not
justify subjecting the defendant to the Three Strikes scheme.183 In addition, some
possible triggering offenses are “wobblers” – a prosecutor may charge them as either a
felony or as a misdemeanor. The latter choice places the defendant outside the Three
Strikes scheme. The trial court may also overrule a prosecutor’s decision to charge a

179
The original version of the “Three Strikes” statute was defeated in legislative committee in 1993.
Supporters then introduced Proposition 184, a ballot initiative with similar content, which was adopted by a
72% majority of voters in the November, 1994 election. Meanwhile, the widely publicized murder of Polly
Klaas energized legislative support for the original measure, and it too was enacted, in amended form, in
March 1994. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 667(e), 1170.12(c) (2002); see Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15-17; Ardaiz,
supra note 179, at 12.
180

Cal. Penal Code Ann.§§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(A) (2002).
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Id.
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Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(e)(2)(A), 1170.12(c)(2)(A).
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See People v. Williams, 163 P.2d 692, 696 (Cal. 1945); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 16-17 (plurality opinion).
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wobbler as a felony, which similarly removes a defendant from the statute’s reach.184
Finally, the trial court may choose to strike a defendant's earlier conviction for a serious
or violent felony so as to avoid triggering the Three Strikes scheme.185
Gary Ewing received a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life when a
California jury convicted him of felony grand theft.186 Ewing had stolen three golf clubs
worth approximately $1200 from the pro shop of a Los Angeles golf course.187 Ewing’s
substantial criminal history included four prior felony convictions arising from a
residential burglary and robbery spree in 1993, as well as seven misdemeanors, including
convictions for burglary, battery, theft, and drug possession.188
Ewing's Eighth Amendment challenge to his conviction was rejected in the
California appellate courts.189 The Supreme Court took the case on direct review.
Ewing’s sentence presented a test of the scope of the holdings in both Harmelin, the
Court's last prison sentencing case, and Solem, its last recidivism case. Ewing’s
triggering offense (grand theft) was more serious than the minor fraud at issue in Solem.
His sentence (parole available after 25 years) was lighter than the sentence of life without
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Cal. Penal Code §§ 17(b)(1), 17(b)(5).
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People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429, 437 (Cal. 1998).
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19-20 (plurality opinion). More precisely, the mandatory sentence for a "third
strike" is an "indeterminate life sentence," for which the offender is eligible for parole in 25 years, or three
times the default parole eligibility term for his offense, or the term of the underlying conviction itself,
including enhancements — whichever is greater. Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(e)(2)(A)(i) – (iii);
1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Ewing's offense entailed parole eligibility in 25 years. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20
(plurality opinion).
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Id. at 17-18.
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Id. at 18-19. Ewing awakened one of his victims while burglarizing her apartment, then threatened her
with a knife, sending her fleeing from the apartment screaming for help. Id.
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People v. Ewing, No. B-143745 (Cal. App. Apr. 25, 2001).
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parole struck down in Solem. His past criminal record, which included armed robbery
and home burglary, was also more severe than Helm’s.
The Court rejected Ewing’s Eighth Amendment claim. No opinion gathered a
majority of Justices. The governing opinion was Justice O’Connor’s, which spoke for a
three-Justice plurality.190 This opinion, when read together with Justice Scalia’s
analytically interesting separate concurrence, furthered the process begun in Harmelin of
articulating a viable standard for the constitutional review of sentencing. The California
Attorney General's brief in Ewing asked the Supreme Court to hold in so many words that
the Eighth Amendment requires a "rational basis" for sentencing.191 While not
employing that precise phrase, Justice O'Connor's opinion gave California, in substance,
what it had requested.
2.

The Plurality Opinion

Justice O'Connor took the Harmelin plurality opinion to govern Ewing's case.192
She reiterated the key formulations of rationality review that appeared in Harmelin:
review of prison sentences is "narrow"193; courts must respect the "primacy of the
190

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14-31 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, author of the Harmelin plurality, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote in Ewing reflected a shift from his position in Harmelin, when he
had concurred in Justice Scalia's originalist argument that the Eighth Amendment authorizes no review of
the magnitude of prison sentences at all. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 et seq. (opinion of Scalia, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J.). One may speculate that Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the Harmelin plurality
opinion was sufficiently justifiable to be entitled to stare decisis effect, even though he declined to join it in
the first instance. See Van Cleave, supra note 13, at 227 (noting this apparent shift in view); cf. Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, in a
majority opinion whose analysis focused heavily on the value of stare decisis rather than on Miranda's
correctness as an original matter).
191

Brief for Respondent, No. 01-6978, Ewing v. California (U.S. 2003).
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 ("The proportionality principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy's
[Harmelin] concurrence guide our application of the Eighth Amendment in the new context that we are
called upon to consider.").
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion).
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legislature" and the "federal system"194; the Eighth Amendment "does not mandate
adoption of any one penological theory"195; and Solem's intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional comparison factors do not become relevant except in "the rare case" in
which a threshold review of the crime and sentence gives rise to an inference of gross
disproportionality.196
Justice O'Connor made clear that, under Harmelin, a court reviewing a sentence
imposed under a recidivism statute is to consider the rationality of the individual sentence
in light of the rationality of the sentencing scheme as a whole. She emphasized that not
only retribution, but also incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation "may play a role in
a State's sentencing scheme."197 Likewise, when considering the justifiability of the
individual sentence, a court must consider how retribution and incapacitation and
deterrence may each contribute to rationalizing the sentence.
In explaining the plurality's review of Ewing'sindividual sentence, Justice
O'Connor introduced some obscurity bystating that she began by weighing "the gravity
of Ewing's offense." This phrase, which originated in Solem,198 suggests a focus on the
inherent retributive severity of Ewing's grand theft ("standing alone," as Justice O'Connor
put it). But the Ewing plurality actually held that the "gravity" of Ewing'soffense could
not be assessed without taking into account "his long history of felony recidivism" and

194

Id. at 23.
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Id. at 25.
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Id. at 30.

197

Id. at 25.
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Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (one of three factors considered in proportionality review should be "the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty").
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thus "the State's public- safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons."199
It would be error, Justice O'Connor indicated, to fail to give "full effect to the State's
choice of th[ese] legitimate penological goal[s]."200
It seems more natural to say that the Ewing plurality engaged in a threshold
review of the overall rationality of Ewing's sentence. Comparing Ewing'ssentence and
statutory scheme with his record and offense of conviction, the Court plurality concluded
that the sentence rationally furthered a sentencing scheme that was adopted in a good
faith attempt to lower California's crime rate:
To be sure, Ewing's sentence is a long one. But it reflects a rational legislative
judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed serious or
violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.201
The plurality thus held the sentence constitutional at the threshold stage, and did
not go on to consider whether Ewing's sentence was comparable to those imposed for
similar offenses in California or in other jurisdictions.202
The plurality opinion was not devoid of empirical analysis. Justice O'Connor
noted that recidivism is "a serious public safety concern" in California.203 In an
interesting passage, she opined that California's "justification" for the Three Strikes "is no
pretext."204 She also discussed evidence suggesting that the Three Strikes law had led to
a decline in the recidivism rate of parolees in California. Other evidence suggested that
199

Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (plurality opinion).
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Id.
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Id. at 30.
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Id. at 30-31.
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Id. at 26.
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Id.
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parolees were actually emigrating from the state to avoid running afoul of the Three
Strikes law.205
3.

Justice Scalia's Criticism of the Harmelin Standard

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.206 He did not join the plurality’s
reasoning, but voted to affirm Ewing’s sentence on the basis of the position he had
adopted in Harmelin: the Eighth Amendment does not authorize constitutional review of
prison sentences.207 Justice Scalia’s opinion included a number of interesting
observations on the plurality’s use of Harmelin's rational basis standard.
Justice Scalia defended his continued refusal to accept Eighth Amendment review
of prison sentences on the ground that the proportionality inquiry developed in Solem and
refined in subsequent cases could not be "intelligibly appl[ied]” by judges.208 Far from

205

Id. at 27.

206

Justice Thomas also concurred separately in the judgment in a brief opinion. He explicitly endorsed
Justice Scalia’s originalist critique in Harmelin and concluded that “the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality principle.” Id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). It followed that Ewing’s
sentence was constitutional. In fact, Justice Thomas expressed a stronger commitment to the originalist
critique that Justice Scalia did. While Thomas agreed that “the … test announced in Solem … is incapable
of judicial application,” he added pointedly that “[e]ven were Solem’s test perfectly clear, … I would not
feel compelled by stare decisis to apply it,” implying that in his view Solem (and presumably Weems) are
plainly mistaken. Id.
This subtle disagreement between the two originalist Justices highlights Justice Thomas’s
signature refusal to give stare decisis effect to precedents that he views as unsupported by the
Constitution’s text and history. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-680 & n.4 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning whether the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrines should continue
to be applied against the states); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(expressing a willingness to “reevaluat[e] … in an appropriate case” the meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should “temper” its post-New Deal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence); see also Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 23 (1994) (offering a short, blunt argument that the Supremacy Clause bars federal courts from
granting stare decisis effect to horizontal precedents in constitutional cases, implying a jurisprudence
similar to Justice Thomas’s).
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Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and
unusual punishments’ was aimed at excluding only certain modes of punishment, and was not a guarantee
against disproportionate sentences.”) (punctuation omitted).
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Id.
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embracing (as Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently did) Harmelin and Ewing's revision of
Solem, Scalia contended that the Ewing plurality's analysis "demonstrate[d]" the
untenability of sentencing review:
Proportionality – the notion that the punishment should fit the crime – is
inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution. … In the
present case, the game is up once the plurality has acknowledged that “the
Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory,”
and that a “sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”
That
acknowledgment having been made, it no longer suffices merely to assess
the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty; that
classic description of the proportionality principle (alone and in itself quite
resistant to policy-free, legal analysis) now becomes merely the first step
of the inquiry.209
In effect, Justice Scalia asserted that the move from Solem to Harmelin rendered
Eighth Amendment scrutiny less tractable, not more so.
Perhaps the plurality should revise its terminology, so that what it reads
into the Eighth Amendment is not the unstated proposition that all
punishment that all punishment should be reasonably proportionate to the
gravity of the offense, but rather the unstated proposition that all
punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the
criminal law. That formulation would make it clearer than ever, of course,
that the plurality is not applying law but evaluating policy.210
Justice Scalia's criticisms appear misguided in two ways. He writes as though Harmelin
replaced Solem’s substantive proportionality review with a kind of generalized
intermediate scrutiny (for “reasonab[ility]”) in which federal judges were to scrutinize the
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Id. at 31 (punctuation and citations omitted).
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Id. at 31. Both dissenting Justices and commentators have expressed criticisms of Ewing and Harmelin
similar to Justice Scalia's. See id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("A threshold test that blocked every
ultimately invalid constitutional claim — even strong ones — would not be a threshold test but a
determinative test. . . . Sentencing comparisons are particularly important because they provide
proportionality review with objective content. By way of contrast, a threshold test makes the assessment of
constitutionality highly subjective.") (emphasis in original); Van Cleave, supra note 13, at 230 ("Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin . . . does not meaningfully contribute to th[e] analysis. . . . [T]he
Harmelin approach is as subjective as one could get.").
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balancing of means and ends in each state’s penal code. If that description were right, it
would indeed be cause for alarm, but Justice Scalia has not accurately identifiedthe
standard described or deployed in Harmelin. On balance, Harmelin does not require
reasonability in sentencing, only rationality.211 Second, given that a rational connection
to a permissible sentencing goal is all that is required, Harmelin and Ewing's broadening
of the permissible bases for a sentence weighs strictly in the direction of reducing the
courts’ discretion to intervene, not increaasing it, just as a switch from intermediate
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny (which requires legislation to rest on an “important”
state interest) to rationality scrutiny (which allows any “legitimate” interest to justify the
statute) does not broaden a reviewing court’s discretion, but narrows it. Certainly Justice
Scalia and other critics of similar views have not suggested why judicial sentencing
review under the narrow Ewing-Harmelin standard is any more intractable or suspect
than the general practice of judicial rationality review of statutes under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which it so intimately resembles.
211

There are sparse references to "reasonableness" in Ewing and Harmelin, but they are promptly undercut
with subsequent language suggesting greater deference, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("It
is enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for believing that dramatically enhanced
sentences for habitual felons 'advanc[e] the goals of its criminal justice system in any substantial way.'")
(quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n.22); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (plurality opinon) ("Michigan could
with good reason concude that petitioner's crime is more serious than the crime in Davis. Similarly, a
rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petitioner's crime is as serious and violent as the crime of
felony murder . . . ").
These remarks are heavily outweighed by the repeated references to rationality review in both
opinions. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (plurality opinion) (holding that only "extreme" sentences are invalid);
id. at 24 (noting Court's "tradition of defer[ence]" to States); id. at 25 (holding that sentencing rationales are
"generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts"); id. at 28 (affirming, in
language borrowed from Fourteenth Amendment case law, that the Court "do[es] not sit as a
'superlegislature'" in reviewing sentences); id. at 29 (holding California statute serves a "legitimate
penological goal"); id. at 30 (holding Ewing's sentence valid because it implements "a rational legislative
judgment, entitled to deference"); accord Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (holding that "substantive penological
judgments" are generally "within the province of legislatures, not courts"); id. at 1000 (noting that
"differing attitudes and local conditions may yield different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the
appropriate length of prison terms for particular crimes"); id. (invoking Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent);
id. at 1001 (only "extreme" sentences are invalid); id. at 1004 (holding that Harmelin's sentence is
supported by "a rational basis").
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4.

Consequences

Ewing yielded a configuration of opinions identical to Harmelin: two Justices
denying the existence of Eighth Amendment noncapital sentencing review and denying
the petitioner's claim, three concurring Justices acknowledging the narrow review of the
Harmelin concurrence but rejecting the petitioner's claim, and four dissenting Justices
urging broad Eighth Amendment review and arguing that the petitioner's claim should
have prevailed. The rule of Marks entails that the three-Justice Ewing plurality binds
lower courts as the governing opinion of the Supreme Court.212
In the next section, I offer a normative defense of the mode of analysis in Ewing
and Harmelin. Before passing to this task, I suggest that the plurality's result in Ewing
was clearly correct, even before turning to questions of theoretical jurisprudence. Ewing
was not a hard case, as long as one grants the premise that Ewing's recidivism – and thus
the complete legislative judgment that yielded his sentence – deserves to be given weight
in evaluating the propriety of his sentence. Ewing was a much worse recidivist than
Rummel or Helm. He had felony convictions for armed robbery (at knifepoint) and three
separate residential burglaries, clearly violent crimes, as well as a misdemeanor battery
and a brace of various minor convictions for theft, drugs, and illegal firearms possession.
In racking up his extensive criminal record, he was a repeated beneficiary of sentences
that imposed only short terms of imprisonment followed by probation; California did not
impose its harsh sentence upon Ewing until after extending leniency to him, repeatedly,
212

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds
. . . .") (quotation marks omitted); but cf. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that, "for
present purposes," dissenters would analyze Ewing's Eighth Amendment claim under the Harmelin
plurality opinion); id. at 32-33 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "it is not clear that this case is
controlled by Harmelin," which did not deal with a recidivist offender).
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over a period of years, in the hope that he would reform. Nor was the offense that
triggered Ewing's 25-to-life sentence, grand theft, a trivial or highly passive one. A
number of commentators have described Ewing as a case about "shoplifting."213
However, the golf clubs Ewing tried to steal were worth almost $1200.214 This is a more
serious property offense than the sort of small theft ordinarily associated with the word
"shoplifting." While $1200 may seem a modest sum to the average appellate lawyer or
federal judge, to the median working American it is nearly half a month's pay, before
taxes.215 This sum is by no means minor.216 Moreover, California could surely have
constitutionally punished Ewing with 25 years imprisonment for his earlier armed
robbery or his burglary spree alone.217 Having instead chosen to impose a milder
punishment for those serious crimes, the state should not be foreclosed from imposing
heightened consequences on Ewing — in effect, revisiting its earlier mercy — when he
spurned the chance to reform his conduct.

III.

THE CASE FOR RATIONALITY REVIEW OF PRISON SENTENCES
Under Ewing and Harmelin, a sentence that reflects a "rational legislative

judgment" and furthers a "legitimate penological goal" will be allowed to stand,
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See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, supra note 18, at 1059.
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion).
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See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60,
Money Income in the United States: 1999 (median annual income for all persons 25 or over is roughly
$31,000).
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See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) ("Even standing alone, Ewing's theft should not be taken
lightly.").
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Cf. Davis, 454 U.S. at 375 (upholding a sentence of 20 years for each of two counts of marijuana
trafficking).
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particularly when there is no suggestion that the claimed motive is a "pretext" for an
illegitimate motive. This is the language of Fourteenth Amendment due process review
under Carolene Products and its progeny. The Court's swing Justices have exported the
rationality standard from a general context to a specific one: from its original home in the
review of statutes to the review of individual dispositions of government power in the
form of criminal sentences.
Ewing and Harmelin got it right. The properlegal meaning of "c ruel and
unusual" in the context of prison sentencing is arbitrary and capricious, and Eighth
Amendment review should be sensitive to whether a supposedly arbitrary sentence is one
that is mandated by statute, or was instead imposed by a single judge or jury.218 This
view, rationality review, is preferable to substantive review, the intrusive level of
appellate sentencing review contemplated by the Solem opinion and the Ewing dissenters.
It is also preferable to Justices Scalia and Thomas's view that the Eighth Amendment has
no application to the magnitude of sentences of imprisonment — which I will follow
Laurence Claus in calling vicious methods review.219
218

For a compelling recent example of the sort of vindictive discretionary sentence barred by the EwingHarmelin standard, see State v. David D.W., 588 S.E.2d 156, 165-66 (W.Va. 2003), where the court held
that a sentence of 1,140 to 2,660 years for 38 incidents of sexual abuse (with the same victim) violated the
Eighth Amendment and the corresponding provision of the West Virginia constitution. The statutory
scheme gave the trial judge essentially unlimited discretion to fashion the millenia-long sentence, by
choosing to sentence the defendant consecutively for each count of conviction.
David D.W. displays in a particularly clear fashion the quasi-procedural, due process-like function
of Eighth Amendment sentencing review argued for in this Article. The case dealt with an unquestionably
grave and reprehensible crime. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals made plain that it considered
the defendant's crimes "heinous and repulsive," id. at 166, and one concurring judge specifically indicated
that he would have considered a traditional life sentence to be appropriate. Id. at 166-67 (Maynard, J.,
concurring). Since no one can serve longer than life in prison, the astronomical sentence struck down in
David D.W. would have been no worse in substantive effect than a sentence that Justice Maynard, and
perhaps other justices, would have been perfectly willing to uphold. Thus the result in David D.W. can
only be explained as resulting from an inference of procedural defect arising from the extraordinary quality
of the sentence.
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Claus, supra note 147, at 120.
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A.

Stare Decisis

Part II's analysis showed that the conception of Eighth Amendment prison
sentencing review as rationality review is currently the law of the land, as supplied by the
plurality opinions in Harmelin and Ewing. It is also the "best fit" interpretation from the
standpoint of stare decisis, fitting the totality of the Supreme Court's case law more
closely than rival interpretations. The rationality-review interpretation preserves the
bedrock holding of Solem that some sentences violate the constitution. It also preserves
the holdings of Rummel, Harmelin and Ewing, which entail that constitutional review of
state sentencing is highly limited. As such, the rationality interpretation benefits from the
presumption of correctness conferred by stare decisis, which is a point in its favor not
enjoyed by the "vicious methods" interpretation endorsed by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Scalia has himself acknowledged that stare decisis considerations are
relevant to originalist judging. 220 His principal argument against extending stare decisis
recognition to the principle of Eighth Amendment review of prison sentences has been
that the principle cannot be "intelligently appl[ied]."221 However, as explained in Part
II.F.3 above, Justice Scalia's objection appears to rest on a misidentification of the
standard imposed by Ewing and Harmelin. The standard is not a general reasonableness
requirement, it only requires the more limited inquiry characteristic of Fourteenth
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Justice Scalia has written:
Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in an ongoing system of law,
must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew . . . [S]tare
decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.

SCALIA, supra note 53, at 38-40.
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J, concurring in the judgment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 984-85 (opinion of
Scalia, J.).
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Amendment rationality review.222 Surely rationality review of sentences is at least as
tractable as rationality review of general legislation.223 If Justice Scalia is not prepared to
abandon Fourteenth Amendment rationality review in general as incapable of judicial
application, then it is hard to see why he is unwilling to give stare decisis effect to the
Harmelin-Ewing standard.
B.

Text and History

The Constitution does not prohibit "excessive punishments," as it prohibits
"excessive fines" and "excessive bail."224 It does not even prohibit "cruel punishments,"
as some state constitutions did at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.225 It only
outlaws punishments that are "cruel and unusual."226
In recent cases dealing with matters outside the context of prison sentencing, the
Supreme Court has veered away from attention to the text of the Eighth Amendment. It
must unfortunately be said that some of the Court's most exuberant recent opinions have
crossed a line to actual misrepresentation of the text. Justice Stevens has written: "The
Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits 'excessive' sanctions" — complete with
222

See supra text accompanying notes 206 to 211.
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In fact, it is probably more tractable. In the context of criminal sentencing, the universe of "legitimate
state interests" that can justify a sentence is numerically limited in a way that does not appear to be true of
the legitimate state interests that might support a piece of legislation. Penologists traditionally identify four
goals of criminal punishment. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (plurality opinion) ("The federal and
state criminal systems have accorded different weights at different times to the penological goals of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."). The federal sentencing guidelines reflect the
same taxonomy of interests. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). While judges, legislators and scholars may and
do disagree powerfully on the weight to be given to these different interests in different contexts, the
existence of a relatively noncontroversial catalog of legitimate interests suggests, again, that rationality
review of sentences is at least as tractable as rationality review of legislation — which few seek to discard.
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See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing N.H. Bill of Rights, art. XVIII (1784)
("cruel or unusual punishments").
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U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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quotation marks — in a criminal case in which the only provision of the Eighth
Amendment at issue was the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, which does not
contain the word "excessive."227 Fortunately, the Court has so far avoided asserting this
fiction in any of its governing opinions in the Harmelin line of cases, so that its future
decisions in this area, as well as the work oflower courts, litigants and commentators, are
less constrained by ill-considered dicta of this nature than in other contexts.
At what might be called the level of naïve textualism, rationality review comports
better with the constitutional text than a mode of review that simply searches for
"excessive" punishments. "A [merely] disproportionate punishment can perhaps always
be considered 'cruel,' but it will not always be (as the text also requires) 'unusual.'"228
Just so. Yet a harsh sentence that lacks a "rational basis," one that appears to reflect
official caprice or vindictiveness, is unusual.
At a more sophisticated originalist level, the legislative history of the Eighth
Amendment and the corresponding provision of the English Bill of Rights gives virtually
no support to thesubstant ive review position,229 but is moreconsistent with the
rationality review position. The key abuse targeted by the English provision was the
exercise of "arbitrary sentencing power" by judges who crafted extreme and vindictive
penalties in particular cases. Cruel and unusual punishments were those that were
227

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 311. It is, again, the use of quotation marks that is remarkable. See
Claus, supra note 147, at 120 ("If th[e] text were meant simply to condemn excessive punishment, why
does it not say so? The term 'excessive' was, after all, on the tip of the drafters' tongues, for they used it in
respect to bail and fines.").
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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See generally the discussions of the Weems dissent and Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion in Part II,
supra text accompanying notes 73 to 78, 139 to 160; Claus, supra note 147, at 121 ("The [Eighth]
Amendment was meant to address a problem distinct from either excessive punishment or vicious
punishment. That problem was discriminatory punishment."); Schwartz, supra note 80, at 380-82.
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"immorally discriminatory in the direction of greater severity."230 The basic objection to
such proceedings is captured in Justice Withins's recorded remark to Titus Oates in
handing down Oates's imaginatively ferocious sentence – "we have taken special care of
you." It is not much of a stretch to imagine the South Dakota judge in State v. Helm
making the same remark to Jerry Helm before sentencing him to life without parole for
passing a bad check, under a recidivist statute that gave essentially no guidance to the
judge's sentencing discretion.231 One can likewise imagine the Arkansas jury in a key
Eighth Circuit case, Henderson v. Norris, channeling Justice Withins and Chief Justice
Jeffreys as they chose to sentence Grover Henderson to life without parole (at the top of a
similarly open-ended sentencing range) for his first criminal offense: delivering less than
one quarter of a gram of cocaine base.232 The Michigan legislature, by contrast, did not
"tak[e] special care" of Ronald Harmelin: it had decided in advance that the possession of
commercial quantities of cocaine merited a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment
without parole, and that is what Harmelin got.233
C.

Political Process Values

In a thoughtful critique of Harmelin and other facets of the Supreme Court's
"proportionality" jurisprudence, Adam Gershowitz has argued that prison sentencing
should receive heightened federal constitutional review because "criminal defendants" are
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Claus, supra note 147, at 122.
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See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83; Karlan, supra note 175.
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258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that Henderson's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment
standard of the Harmelin plurality).
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961 n.1 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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"a discrete and insular minority that will be prejudiced by the political process."234 While
Harmelin and Ewing effectively liken state prison sentences to the catch- all "regulatory
legislation" category of the Carolene Products Fourteenth Amendment framework,
Gershowitz's language suggests the view that they are more analogous to the "special"
class of laws disadvantaging discrete and insular minorities, which receive "more
searching judicial inquiry."235
Gershowitz notes accurately that convicted felons generally cannot vote,236 and
states that “criminal defendants” are politically unpopular.237 He admits that courts have
routinely refused to hold criminal defendants a protected class for equal protection
purposes,238 but relies upon John Hart Ely's widely discussed defense of a
"representation-reinforcing" approach to constitutional adjudication in his Democracy
and Discontent.239
In framing his political process argument, however, Gershowitzhas subtly
misstated the issue. The relevant societal class for purposes of deciding the desirability
(as a policy matter) of intrusive judicial review of prison sentences is not criminal
defendants; rather, it is convicted criminals. In fact, from the standpoint of the Eighth
Amendment, only the class of criminal defendants who have been duly convicted after a
procedurally proper trial is ordinarily at issue. For if a constitutional defect had afflicted
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Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 1301.
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Cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
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Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 1298-99.
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Id. at 1299-1300.
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Id. at 1301 n.269, citing Prisoners' Rights, 84 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1494 n.2975 (1996) (collecting cases).
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Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 27, at 88.
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the guilt phase of a defendant's trial, then presumably his conviction would have been
vacated without regard to the magnitude of his subsequent sentence; a court would not
need to consider whether the sentence was excessive.
Once this distinction is cleared up, the notion that Eighth Amendment claimants,
duly convicted of crime, should be regarded as a discrete and insular minority entitled to
protections not authorized by the text of the Constitution is unpersuasive. Membership in
the class does not involve an immutable characteristic of individuals240; one can avoid
being a member by not committing crimes. And unlike the treatment of criminal suspects
— who are subject to a presumption of innocence, and who may be unable to exercise
any meaningful control over whether the “characteristic” of being suspected applies to
them241 — the very different “characteristic” of being legitimately guilty of criminal
conduct is properly viewed as inherently undesirable. It is a validbasis for
“discrimination."
D.

Neutral Interpretation

Viewing the Supreme Court's noncapital sentencing cases over the past 25 years
through the lens of rationality review is also advantageous from the standpoint of
institutional legitimacy. The Court has sometimes spoken of “deferring” to legislatures
in the context of Eighth Amendment noncapital review. Such rhetoric, however, is
troubling from a standpoint of textualism and of neutral jurisprudence. Ceteris paribus,
and given identical data, an interpretation according to which the Court is fairly applying
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Cf. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4 (protected minorities must be "discrete and insular").
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See William Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20
(1996) (opining that “the universe of criminal suspects” is a prime example of a “grou[p] that find[s] it hard
or impossible to protect [itself] through the political process”).
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a principle supplied by the Constitution is surely to be preferred to one in which it is
applying a principle only grudgingly or waveringly. One may say that legislatures have a
general authority to define crimes (as they do to set penalties for them) but when those
definitions impinge on the Constitution’s textual guarantee of freedom of speech, for
example, one rarely hears talk of courts “deferring” to the legislature in gauging whether
a First Amendment violation has occurred.242 Likewise, in First Amendment analysis it
makes no difference whether the challenged state action was brought about by a single
government decisionmaker (such as a judge or jury imposing damages in a libel case
against a public figure)243 or is the considered judgment of the whole legislature (such as
a statute prohibiting sedition)244; yet, as previously discussed, this does seem to matter in
the Eighth Amendment prison cases. If the evil at which the cruel and unusual
punishments clause is targeted is simply "disproportionate" punishments, it is not obvious
why courts should “defer” to the legislature at all in deciding whether that constitutional
guarantee has been infringed. Yet the Court’s Eighth Amendment opinions do suggest
that judge-made discretionary sentences deserve tougher scrutiny than sentences
mandated by a legislature.245 Courts that pick and choose in such a fashion make
themselves vulnerable to troubling criticism.246

242

See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (adopting a balancing
approach to First Amendment adjudication, but conceding that the First Amendment's guarantee is
"absolute" in at least "the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail").

243

See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (overturning conviction for attempting to incite
insurrection).
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See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006-07 (plurality opinion).
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The best known contemporary example is Judge Alex Kozinski's dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc in the Second Amendment case of Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003):

61

The fact that the Court defers in these various ways in noncapital Eighth
Amendment cases should lead us to concludethat the cruel and unusual punishments
clause is targeting a different evil than mere harshness per se. Instead, as has been argued
in this Article, it should be understood as a quasi-procedural guarantee against abuse of
the authority to fix punishments. Usurpatious or arbitrary or spiteful prison sentences
are cruel and unusual.
E.

Federalism

The Supreme Court has described the definition and enforcement of criminal law
as a field "where States historically have been sovereign,"247 and the fixing of
punishments for crimes as "peculiarly a question of legislative policy."248 Modes of
judicial review of sentencing that preserve the states' independence in this area are not
only consistent with tradition, but are likely to produce normatively beneficial results. It
has even been argued that federalism is "likely to be more important to the libertyand
well being of the American people than any other structural feature of our Constitution,
including the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, and judicial review."249
Allowing the states latitude in choosing among different penological theories
creates opportunities for each state to learn from the experiences of others. The tough

It is wrong to use some constitutional provisions as springboards for major social change while
treating others like senile relatives to be cooped up in a nursing home until they quit annoying us.
Expanding some to gargantuan proportions while discarding others like a crumpled gum wrapper
is not faithfully applying the Constitution; it’s using our power as federal judges to
constitutionalize our personal preferences.
247

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
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Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).

249

Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 756 (1995). Calabresi's article contains one of the classic statements of
the "normative case for federalism" to be found in the legal academic literature. See id. at 756-790.
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California "Three Strikes" statute in Ewing v. California provided a significant example
of such experimentation. As Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion noted, evidence
suggested that the California statute had produced a decrease in recidivism and an exodus
of felons from the state.250 The plurality in Harmelin similarly viewed Michigan's
adoption of a mandatory life sentence for possession of commercial quantities of cocaine
as a rational experiment designed to combat serious social maladies caused by drugs.251
Standard pro-federalism arguments based on accountability and responsiveness
also support the rule of Ewing and Harmelin. An approach that allows states to display a
good deal of moral diversity in fixing crimes and punishments is more likely to yield a
penal code that accords with local conditions and local moral beliefs.252 Justice Scalia
put the point concretely in Harmelin by contending that "the members of the Michigan
Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the streets of Detroit."253
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27 (plurality opinion); see generally Ardaiz, supra note 179.
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008 ("Reasonable minds may differ about the efficacy of Michigan's sentencing
scheme, and it is far from certain that Michigan's bold experiment will succeed."). Justice Kennedy also
cited Justice Brandeis's famous dictum on the role of the states as laboratories:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), cited in Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 1008 (plurality opinion).
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Elaborating this point, Professor Calabresi argues that federalism "helps ensure a more informed
weighing of costs and benefits than often occurs on the national level where taxpayers often may be less
cognizant of the social costs of particular legislation," and that "competition among jurisdictions creates
incentives for each jurisdiction to provide bundles of goods that will maximize utility for a majority of the
voters in that jurisdiction. Calabresi, supra note 249, at 777.
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Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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A rejection of Ewing and Harmelin would eliminate many of these potential
benefits. The principaldissenting opinion in Ewing, by Justice Breyer,254 contemplates
significant intrusion by federal judges on the formulation of state penal codes. Justice
Breyer estimated at one point in his opinoin that Ewing's sentence was at least "2 to 3
times the length of sentences that other jurisdictions would impose in similar
circumstances," and offered this as a basis for viewing the sentence as likely
unconstitutional.255

Yet Justice Breyer then acknowledged in an appendix to his opinion

that at least five states authorized punishments equal to or greater than Ewing's in similar
circumstances.256 The prospect of the dissenters' Eighth Amendment regime is sobering.
Under it, a state, indeed a sizable group of different states, apparently would not be
permitted to vary more than two to three times from the choices of the rest of the country
in fixing a punishment for a given offense. Adopting Justice Breyer's Ewing dissent
would thus impose real costs to federalism; it would portend a considerable loss of
flexibility and independence among the criminal justice systems of the states.257
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Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's dissent.
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 59-61 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Breyer, J.) (noting that, at a minimum, the laws of
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Dakota would authorize a life sentence — technically,
in Montana's case, a 100-year sentence — with a time before parole eligibility equal to or greater than
Ewing's, in circumstances similar to Ewing's crime).
257

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989-90 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citations omitted):
That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish with the
mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may criminalize an act
that other States do not criminalize at all. Indeed, a State may criminalize an act that other States
choose to reward -- punishing, for example, the killing of endangered wild animals for which other
States are offering a bounty. What greater disproportion could there be than that? . . . Diversity not
only in policy, but in the means of implementing policy, is the very raison d'etre of our federal
system. Though the different needs and concerns of other States may induce them to treat
[Harmelin's crime of simple possession of 672 grams of cocaine as a relatively minor offense, . . .
nothing in the Constitution requires Michigan to follow suit.
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IV.

RECONCILING RATIONALITY REVIEW OF PRISON SENTENCING
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF
SANCTIONS
The Supreme Court's decisions in the broad area of constitutionality

proportionality review have encompassed criminal and civil sanctions ranging from
capital punishment to prison terms, prison conditions, fines, and punitive damages.
These disparate cases do not allreflect a single overarching standard , and I do not claim
that any amount of interpretive adjustment can make them allperfectly cons istent.
However, there are a number of important points of congruence among the cases. A
stable body of doctrine can be articulated in which prison terms, and most other forms of
state sanction, are reviewed for rationality, as argued in this Article.
A.

Conditions of Confinement

The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment law on the legality of prison conditions
employs the same rationality standard applicable to terms of imprisonment. Conditions
of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment if they "involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain"258 and are "totally without penological justification,"259
virtually indistinguishable from the standard of Harmelin and Ewing.260 Furthermore, the
test used in the prison conditions cases has a subjective component like that found in the
sentencing cases. Courts pay attention to the subjective motivations that produced a
given condition as well as the sheer harshness of the condition. Prison conditions violate
258

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
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Id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (plurality opinion) (upholding Ewing's sentence because it furthered a "legitimate
penological goal"); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999, 1004 (plurality opinion).
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the Eighth Amendment only if the decision makers have a "culpable state of mind"
suggesting "deliberate indifference."261
This is an important source of consistency in the case law. The prison sentencing
cases plus the prison conditions cases means that a single, broad constitutional standard
of rationality governs all application of state sanctions against those duly convicted of an
offense punishable by imprisonment. Neither the length of sentence nor the conditions in
which the sentence is served may be the result of an arbitrary, capricious, or vindictive
exercise of discretion by a state decisionmaker.
B.

Punitive Damages

To many the most objectionable source of inconsistency in the Court's
jurisprudence arises from its recent decisions striking down high punitive damages
awards as violative of the Due Process Clause, even as Eighth Amendment decisions like
Ewing and Harmelin allow tough prison sentences to stand. In the past decade, in the
State Farm262 and Gore263 cases, a majority of the Supreme Court has begun to invalidate
large punitive damages awards in state court on the ground that they are "grossly
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor" and thereby violate the due process
clause.264
Gore invalidated an Alabama jury's award of $2 million in punitive damages and
$4,000 in actual damages against BMW for a nationwide practice of selling new cars
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Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 303 (1991).
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416; Gore, 517 U.S. at 562.
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without disclosing that they had been repainted.265 More recently, State Farm invalidated
a Utah jury's award of $145 million in punitive damages and $1 million in actual
damages against State Farm for a variety of torts premised on the insurance company's
bad faith failure to settle a wrongful death and tort action against the Campbells within
the policy limits.266 The plaintiffs presented evidence of a variety of actions by State
Farm in the Campbells' case, and across the nation, that suggested a strong degree of bad
faith by the insurer.267 However, the Supreme Court held the punitive damages award
unconstitutional, and suggested sweeping substantive limits on the magnitude of punitive
damage awards. The majority "decline[d] . . . to impose a bright-line ratio," but stated in
a remarkable passage that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a signficant degree, will satisfy due process."268

265

Id. at 562-64.
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State Farm, 538 U.S. at 412-16, 419 ("Under the principles outlined in . . . Gore, this case is neither
close nor difficult.").
267

The salient facts were disclosed in part in the majority's opinion, and more fully in Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion. The plaintiffs presented evidence that State Farm's own investigation concluded that
Mr. Campbell was at fault for the lethal car crash that led to the tort claims against him. The company's
claims adjuster originally reported that the cost to settle the case would likely be high, but his superiors
ordered him to alter that portion of his report. Id. at 433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A manager also
instructed the claims adjuster to insert false material in his report impugning the character of the accident
victim. Id. at 432. The company contested liability at trial and refused offers to settle for the policy limits
of $50,000. Id. at 413 (majority opinion). However, the jury found against Campbell and entered a verdict
for $185, 849. State Farm refused to fund an appeal and at first refused to cover the excess liability. Its
counsel suggested that Campbell "put for sale signs on [his] property to get things moving." Id. There was
evidence that State Farm had implemented a company-wide plan in Utah, and across the nation, to deny
benefits properly owed to customers in order to meet internal profit targets. Id. at 431-32 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Employees were instructed to target "the weakest of the herd" in choosing which customers to
deny benefits. Id. at 433. Finally, evidence suggested that the company destroyed incriminating
documents that would have demonstrated its policies of denying coverage in bad faith. Id. at 434-35.
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Id. at 425.
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Indeed, the Court opined that the Campbells' case "likely would justify a punitive
damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages."269
Such sweeping language is hard to reconcile with the Court's careful approach to
due process-style review of prison terms in the Ewing-Harmelin sequence of cases.
Academic condemnation of the Court's twin handling of the cases has been practically
universal.270 Something, the commentators agree, has to give.
The commentators' concerns are reasonable, yet the conflict between the two
strands of case law is not as sharp as is generally assumed. A closer appraisal of State
Farm and Gore discloses that their holdings (though not all of their language) can in fact
be reconciled with the holdings in the prison sentencing cases, and the general standards
of due process review.
In both State Farm and Gore, the victorious plaintiffs offered evidence of the
defendant's alleged wrongdoing in other states as a basis for a large award of punitive
damages in the forum state.271 Yet neither set of plaintiffs made any showing that the
conduct introduced into evidence was unlawful in the states where it had occurred. The
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Id. at 429.
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See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, supra note 18, at 1062-63; Brennan, Note,
supra note 13, at 552 (calling on Supreme Court to "assert a more active role" in reviewing prison
sentences); Van Cleave, supra note 13, at 219-220 ("The Supreme Court . . . continue[s] to give teeth to
proportionality review of . . . monetary punishments. . . . Yet, ironically, the Court has not shown the same
concern about excessiveness and disproportionality when the punishment is imprisonment, a deprivation of
liberty. . . . [T]he Court should give terms of imprisonment at least the same level of scrutiny used to
evaluate punitive damages awards and forfeitures for proportionality."); Gershowitz, supra note 13,
(criticizing the Supreme Court's respective approaches to prison sentencing and punitive damages as not
only inconsistent but "backwards").
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State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414-15 (noting that trial court had denied motion in limine to exclude evidence
of out of state acts); id. at 420 ("This case . . . was used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived
deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country."); Gore, 517 U.S. at 571-74. "Alabama
does not have the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no
impact on Alabama or its residents." Id. at 572-73.
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Supreme Court plausibly viewed this as an infringement of constitutional prohibitions
against extraterritorial application of a state's laws.272 It also suggested that the use of the
out-of-state evidence and argument violated principles of fair notice to defendants.273 (In
contrast to the ongoing controversy over "substantive" due process, the procedural
requirement of fair notice is one of the least controversial aspects of review under the due
process clause.)
Two factors tend to justify the judicial interventions in State Farm and Gore.
Punitive damages awards are typically imposed by jurors who must select a number from
within a wide, if not unbounded, discretionary range. In this respect, they present a
greater danger of arbitrary behavior than do mandatory penalties: they resemble the
Solem paradigm rather than the Harmelin paradigm. In addition, State Farm and Gore
are cases about extraterritoriality as well as excessiveness. than inflexible substantive
limits on the magnitude of punitive damages. One may test this proposition by imagining
a case involving the same outrageous misconduct by the defendant as State Farm, but
where, contrary to the actual facts, the plaintiff's argument and evidence were strictly
limited to acts of misconduct within the state rendering the punitive damages judgment,
thus eliminating or greatly reducing the extraterritoriality and notice concerns that
informed the Supreme Court's holding. This reimagined version of State Farm would run
272

State Farm invoked authority stating a general constitutional principle against extraterritoriality, see 538
U.S. at 420-22, citing, inter alia, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("It would be
impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State."). Gore drew
more specifically upon cases decided under the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause. See 517 U.S. at 57172 ("[O]ne State's power to impose burdens on the interstate market . . . is not only subordinate to the
federal power over interstate commerce . . . but is also constrained by the need to respect the interests of
other States"), citing, inter alia, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
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State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 ("[E]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose."), quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at
574 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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roughly parallel to Harmelin: i.e., a concededly serious wrongful act that the state
punishes with a severe sanction, a life sentence without parole in Harmelin, a $145
million punitive award in State Farm. The parallel still would not be perfect, because the
penalty in State Farm would still be the result of a broad discretionary judgment by the
jury and trial judge (similar to Solem), which should properly receive more due process
scrutiny that a general legislative judgment like the mandatory sentence in Harmelin.
Nevertheless, in the reimagined State Farm, the sanction imposed by the jury would
reflect a rational moral judgment, furthering the legitimate interests of deterring and
punishing State Farm's conduct in Utah, and it would be difficult to call a $145 million
award arbitrary or capricious in light of the facts. In such a case, the "single digit"
guideline suggested by the majority in State Farm should not control.274 It should give
way to the more flexible requirement of rationality in Ewing and Harmelin, and the jury's
judgment should stand.
C.

Fines

Fines imposed as criminal punishment present issues similar to punitive damages.
However, proportionality analysis of fines involves a different textual provision of the
Constitution than either punitive damages (which are reviewed under the due process
clause) or other criminal sanctions (which are reviewed under the prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments," in conformity with Fourteenth Amendment due process
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Judge Posner has taken a related view of State Farm in Matthias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347
F.3d 672, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2003), which upheld, against a due process challenge, a jury's award of
$186,000 punitive damages and $5,000 compensatory damages against a hotel chain that "outrageous[ly]"
tricked guests into renting rooms that it knew were infested with painful bedbugs. Id. at 678. Judge Posner
reasoned that, in light of the low level of compensable harm, the punitive damages award "serve[d] the . . .
purpose of limiting the defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and (private)
prosecution." Id. State Farm and its predecessors, in Judge Posner's view, require judges to police "a
range, not a point" in evaluating awards of punitive damages. Id. at 678.
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requirements). By the terms of the Eighth Amendment, fines need not be "cruel and
unusual" to be unconstitutional; they need only be "excessive."275 It is reasonable, in the
face of such language, for courts to review fines for substantivedisproportionality , while
reviewing other common punishments only for arbitrariness, as in Ewing, Harmelin, and
the prison conditions cases.276
The Supreme Court's principal case on the Excessive Fines Clause coheres with
such an analysis. United States v. Bajakajian277 invalidated the application of a federal
statute that would have required the defendant to forfeit $357,144 as a penalty for
attempting to move it out of the country without obeying federal reporting
requirements.278 A five-Justice majority, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that the
forfeiture was "grossly disproportionate" to Bajakajian's offense and violated the Eighth
Amendment.279 In gauging the appropriateness of the fine, the Bajakajian majority used
the full-blooded proportionality analysis originally deployed in the prison sentencing
context in Solem v. Helm, including Solem's use of mandatory inter- and
intrajurisdictional comparisons.280
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U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . . . ").
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Cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989-90 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (arguing that it was reasonable of the Framers to
prohibit excessiveness in bail and fines, which are "sources of revenue" to the State, but not in other modes
of punishment); See Claus, supra note 147, at 120 (noting the apparent significance of the distinction
between "excessive" and "cruel and unusual").
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524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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Id. at 324-26; see 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994); 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994).
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See id. at 336-37.
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Id. at 339. The majority gave weight to the fact that under the federal sentencing guidelines, the
maximum conventional fine for Bajakajian's offense was a mere $5,000.
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As Pamela Karlan has observed, the analysis in Bajakajian also followed Solem
by focusing its analysis on the factor of retribution: the inherent wrongness of the
offense, compared to the magnitude of the fine. The Court did not engage in the looser
textured, Ewing-Harmelin brand of rationality review, under which many different penal
interests may be considered simultaneously, and a combination of deterrence and
incapacitation can justify a sanction that would not be justifiable in light of strictly
retributive considerations.281
Bajakajian's use of Solem's disproportionality standard admittedly creates a tangle
in the case law. Why is the excessive fines inquiry to be governed by a standard that the
Court had first formulated in the context of prison sentencing and then rejected (in
Harmelin, seven years before Bajakajian) as overbroad? To resolve this tangle, there is
no choice but textualism. The test put forth in Solem was a plausible version of what the
Eighth Amendment would require if it prohibited "excessive" prison sentences, which it
does not.282 It was therefore reasonable for the Bajakajian Court to export Solem's
excessiveness inquiry into a context where the constitution really does prohibit
"excessiveness" — fines — even though the Court was also correct to scale back Solem
in its original context of prison sentences, where review is only authorized for
arbitrariness.
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See id. at 339; Karlan, supra note 175, at 900-01 ("Ironically, Bajakajian seems to revive, for cases
where the criminal punishment is a fine, the very sort of inquiry that the Harmelin and Ewing Courts
rejected with respect to cases where the . . . punishment is a prison sentence. . . . The Court seems to
analyze the gravity of Bajakajian's offense solely from a retributivist perspective.").
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Pace, again, recent Court dicta such as Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
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D.

Capital Punishment

The candid interpreter must acknowledge the existence of at least one irreducible
division in the proportionality case law: the one separating capital punishment from all
other sanctions. Death penalty cases have imposed a host of demanding requirements
intended to ensure proportionality between the punishment and the crime.283 Under
current Eighth Amendment law, the death penalty is constitutionally prohibited for nonaggravated murder,284 felony murder absent an intent to kill,285 and rape286; it cannot be
imposed on the mildly retarded287 or those under age 18 at the time of their offense288; it
cannot be imposed as a mandatory penalty289; and sentencing juries or judges must be
empowered to take all relevant mitigating evidence into account.290 These requirements
go far beyond the limited scrutiny employed in the prison sentencing cases, and indeed
beyond the punitive damages and fines cases.291
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Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
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Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).

287

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005).
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Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("Our cases creating and clarifying the
'individualized capital sentencing doctrine' have repeatedly suggested that there is no comparable
requirement outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference between death and all other
penalties."); id. at 997 (plurality opinion) (the "most extensive application" of the proportionality principle
"has been in death penalty cases"); Dressler, supra note 111, at § 6.05[C], p. 49 (contrasting Court's limited
"oversight of non-capital sentences" with death penalty cases).
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To be sure, the kind of rationality review exemplified by the Ewing-Harmelin line
of cases (what might be called, following the argument of this Article, the "due process"
aspect of the Eighth Amendment) has also sometimes influenced the Justices. It was
precisely the impression of overwhelming arbitrariness in the imposition of death that
appears to have motivated Justice Douglas to concur in the judgment in Furman v.
Georgia, invalidating existing capital punishment statutes:
There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from
which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim
was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature. . . .
[W]e deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing
these crimes should die or be imprisoned.292
Nevertheless, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence goes far beyond
arbitrariness review. It imposes squarely substantive judgments of proportionality in
cases subject to reasonable moral disagreement.293
Explanation of the Court's "death is different"294 jurisprudence must likewise be
normative and substantive. True, the framers of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
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Douglas's interpretation).

293

In Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited the sentence of death in all
cases involving offenders younger than 18 when their crimes were committed. 125 S.Ct. at 1200; see id. at
1191-92 (asserting that "in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.") (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312). The
facts of Roper itself indicated just how contestable that judgment was. The petitioner, Simmons, was
convicted for a brutal and premeditated murder he committed at age 17. He talked before the murder about
his desire to kill someone, and formulated a plan with two confederates. He assured his friends that they
could "get away with" the crime because they were minors. Id. at 1187. Simmons broke into the victim's
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Clause and its English predecessors put emphasis on abuses of "cruel and barbarous"
bodily methods of punishment, from the trial of Titus Oates forward.295 This gives a
certain originalist pedigree to the notion that state-imposed death deserves more scrutiny
than more commonplace and less spectacular sanctions such as imprisonment. The
qualitative difference between death and other punishments is mirrored in the qualitative
difference between Eighth Amendment (and due process) review of death and review of
other sanctions. At the same time, the streams of precedent in capital and noncapital
proportionality review have been so divergent for so long that they no longer exert much
gravitational pull on one another. To bring a coherent and justifiableorder to the practice
of constitutional review of noncapital sanctions may be ambition enough.

V.

CONCLUSION
A durable idea about the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its due process

clause, holds that it "add[s] greatly to the dignity and glory of . . . citizenship,"296 by
acting as a "bulwar[k] against arbitrary legislation."297 As interpreted by Carolene
Products and its progeny, the due process clause confers a The Eighth Amendment, in its
application to individual prison sentences, is best understood as extending that same
principle to the magnitude of individual terms of imprisonment. This conception is
normatively defensible on its own terms, and it sheds light on the constitutional review of
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other noncapital sanctions — fines, punitive damages, and conditions of imprisonment.
It suggests a general principle, implemented through the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, prohibiting the arbitrary and capricious application of state force to the
individual.
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